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Single Idea 16443

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties ]

Full Idea

I take properties and relations to be modal notions. Properties are to be understood in terms of what it would be for them to be exemplified, which means understanding them in terms of a range of possible situations.

Gist of Idea

Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified

Source

Robert C. Stalnaker (Mere Possibilities [2012], 1.2)

Book Ref

Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Mere Possibilities' [Princeton 2012], p.11

A Reaction

I can't make head or tail of a property as anything other than a feature of some entity. Treating properties as a 'range of situations' is just as baffling to me as treating them as sets of objects.

Related Idea

Idea 16437 Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker]

The 27 ideas from 'Mere Possibilities'

16433 Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker]
16437 Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker]
16434 Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist [Stalnaker]
16436 Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics [Stalnaker]
16438 Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them [Stalnaker]
16439 A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location [Stalnaker]
16440 I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance [Stalnaker]
16443 Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified [Stalnaker]
16444 Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker]
16445 I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space [Stalnaker]
16442 I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker]
16447 A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth [Stalnaker]
16446 Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker]
16448 Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it [Stalnaker]
16449 In modal set theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members [Stalnaker]
16450 Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions [Stalnaker]
16452 Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker]
16453 The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties [Stalnaker]
16454 Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker]
16461 We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language [Stalnaker]
16464 We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities [Stalnaker]
16465 In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't [Stalnaker]
16466 Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false [Stalnaker]
16467 'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human [Stalnaker]
16468 Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities [Stalnaker]
16471 I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties [Stalnaker]
16474 How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know? [Stalnaker]