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Single Idea 16445
[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
]
Full Idea
I prefer to think of the possible worlds not as points in logical space but as cells of a relatively fine-grained partition of logical space - a partition that makes all the distinctions we need.
Gist of Idea
I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space
Source
Robert C. Stalnaker (Mere Possibilities [2012], 1.2)
Book Ref
Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Mere Possibilities' [Princeton 2012], p.13
A Reaction
Since he regards possible worlds as simply a means of regimenting our understanding of modality, he can think of possible worlds in any way that suits him. I find it hard work tuning in to his vision.
Related Idea
Idea 16444
Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker]
The
65 ideas
from Robert C. Stalnaker
12761
|
An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists
[Stalnaker]
|
12762
|
Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics
[Stalnaker]
|
12763
|
Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential
[Stalnaker]
|
12764
|
For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects
[Stalnaker]
|
12765
|
Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball
[Stalnaker]
|
12766
|
Logical space is abstracted from the actual world
[Stalnaker]
|
18052
|
An assertion aims to add to the content of a context
[Stalnaker, by Magidor]
|
14718
|
An assertion is an attempt to rule out certain possibilities, narrowing things down for good planning
[Stalnaker, by Schroeter]
|
16422
|
The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts
[Stalnaker]
|
16423
|
Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of
[Stalnaker]
|
16421
|
Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part
[Stalnaker]
|
16429
|
A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time
[Stalnaker]
|
16430
|
Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension
[Stalnaker]
|
16428
|
Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract
[Stalnaker]
|
16431
|
In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content
[Stalnaker]
|
16432
|
One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content
[Stalnaker]
|
18823
|
To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan
[Stalnaker, by Rumfitt]
|
16409
|
Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory
[Stalnaker]
|
16411
|
If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time
[Stalnaker]
|
16412
|
If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism
[Stalnaker]
|
16410
|
Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension
[Stalnaker]
|
16433
|
Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones?
[Stalnaker]
|
16434
|
Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist
[Stalnaker]
|
16437
|
Possible worlds are properties
[Stalnaker]
|
16436
|
Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics
[Stalnaker]
|
16439
|
A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location
[Stalnaker]
|
16440
|
I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance
[Stalnaker]
|
16438
|
Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them
[Stalnaker]
|
16442
|
I take propositions to be truth conditions
[Stalnaker]
|
16443
|
Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified
[Stalnaker]
|
16444
|
Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure
[Stalnaker]
|
16445
|
I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space
[Stalnaker]
|
16447
|
A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth
[Stalnaker]
|
16446
|
Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist
[Stalnaker]
|
16448
|
Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it
[Stalnaker]
|
16449
|
In modal set theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members
[Stalnaker]
|
16450
|
Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions
[Stalnaker]
|
16452
|
Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually
[Stalnaker]
|
16453
|
The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties
[Stalnaker]
|
16454
|
Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics
[Stalnaker]
|
16461
|
We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language
[Stalnaker]
|
16465
|
In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't
[Stalnaker]
|
16464
|
We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities
[Stalnaker]
|
16467
|
'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human
[Stalnaker]
|
16466
|
Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false
[Stalnaker]
|
16468
|
Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities
[Stalnaker]
|
16471
|
I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties
[Stalnaker]
|
16474
|
How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know?
[Stalnaker]
|
14616
|
A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations
[Stalnaker]
|
14617
|
Predicates can't apply to what doesn't exist
[Stalnaker]
|
15793
|
We can take 'ways things might have been' as irreducible elements in our ontology
[Stalnaker, by Lycan]
|
16396
|
Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical
[Stalnaker]
|
16403
|
'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts
[Stalnaker]
|
16398
|
Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries
[Stalnaker]
|
16397
|
If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways
[Stalnaker]
|
16399
|
Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains
[Stalnaker]
|
16401
|
To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true
[Stalnaker]
|
16406
|
If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean
[Stalnaker]
|
16404
|
In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent
[Stalnaker]
|
16405
|
To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient?
[Stalnaker]
|
16407
|
Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular
[Stalnaker]
|
16408
|
Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals
[Stalnaker]
|
14286
|
In nearby worlds where A is true, 'if A,B' is true or false if B is true or false
[Stalnaker]
|
14285
|
A possible world is the ontological analogue of hypothetical beliefs
[Stalnaker]
|
10994
|
Conditionals are true if minimal revision of the antecedent verifies the consequent
[Stalnaker, by Read]
|