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Single Idea 16446

[filed under theme 19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions ]

Full Idea

It seems plausible that singular propositions are object-dependent in the sense that the proposition would not exist if the individual did not. It is also plausible that some objects exist contingently, and there are singular propositions about them.

Gist of Idea

Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist

Source

Robert C. Stalnaker (Mere Possibilities [2012], 2)

Book Ref

Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Mere Possibilities' [Princeton 2012], p.22


A Reaction

This replies to the view that possible worlds are maximal sets of propositions, and so must exist for the worlds to exist; e.g. Lowe 1999:248. That is yet another commonplace of contemporary philosophy which I find utterly bewildering.


The 14 ideas with the same theme [propositions as made of real objects]:

In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell]
In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts' [Russell, by Quine]
Propositions as objects of judgement don't exist, because we judge several objects, not one [Russell/Whitehead]
If propositions are facts, then false and true propositions are indistinguishable [Davidson on Russell]
Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts [Moore,GE, by Potter]
If propositions are concrete they don't have to exist, and so they can't be necessary truths [Plantinga]
Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker]
A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations [Stalnaker]
Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson]
Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components [Mares]
Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it [Merricks]
Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs [Merricks]
Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking? [Hofweber]
Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication [Recanati]