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Single Idea 16447
[filed under theme 19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
]
Full Idea
A minimal theory of propositions can make do with just two primitive properties: a property of consistency applied to sets of propositions, and a property of truth applied to propositions.
Gist of Idea
A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth
Source
Robert C. Stalnaker (Mere Possibilities [2012], 2)
Book Ref
Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Mere Possibilities' [Princeton 2012], p.24
A Reaction
I would have thought a minimal theory would need some account of what a proposition is supposed to be (since there seems to be very little agreement about that). Stalnaker goes on to sketch a theory.
The
27 ideas
from 'Mere Possibilities'
16433
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Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones?
[Stalnaker]
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16434
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Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist
[Stalnaker]
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16436
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Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics
[Stalnaker]
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16437
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Possible worlds are properties
[Stalnaker]
|
16439
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A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location
[Stalnaker]
|
16440
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I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance
[Stalnaker]
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16438
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Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them
[Stalnaker]
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16442
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I take propositions to be truth conditions
[Stalnaker]
|
16443
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Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified
[Stalnaker]
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16444
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Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure
[Stalnaker]
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16445
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I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space
[Stalnaker]
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16447
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A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth
[Stalnaker]
|
16446
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Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist
[Stalnaker]
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16448
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Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it
[Stalnaker]
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16449
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In modal set theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members
[Stalnaker]
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16450
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Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions
[Stalnaker]
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16452
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Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually
[Stalnaker]
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16453
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The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties
[Stalnaker]
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16454
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Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics
[Stalnaker]
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16461
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We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language
[Stalnaker]
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16464
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We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities
[Stalnaker]
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16465
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In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't
[Stalnaker]
|
16466
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Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false
[Stalnaker]
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16467
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'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human
[Stalnaker]
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16468
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Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities
[Stalnaker]
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16471
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I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties
[Stalnaker]
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16474
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How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know?
[Stalnaker]
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