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Full Idea
Lewis was suspicious of boxes and diamonds as regimenting ordinary modal thought, …preferring a first-order extensional theory including possible worlds in its domain and an indexical singular term for the actual world.
Gist of Idea
For modality Lewis rejected boxes and diamonds, preferring worlds, and an index for the actual one
Source
report of David Lewis (Anselm and Actuality [1970]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 3.8
Book Ref
Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Mere Possibilities' [Princeton 2012], p.83
| 9403 | There are three different deductions for actual terms, necessary terms and possible terms [Aristotle] |
| 9470 | Modal logic is not an extensional language [Parsons,C] |
| 16456 | For modality Lewis rejected boxes and diamonds, preferring worlds, and an index for the actual one [Lewis, by Stalnaker] |
| 14670 | Metaphysical (alethic) modal logic concerns simple necessity and possibility (not physical, epistemic..) [Salmon,N] |
| 7689 | The modal logic of C.I.Lewis was only interpreted by Kripke and Hintikka in the 1960s [Jacquette] |
| 8859 | The main modal logics disagree over three key formulae [Yablo] |
| 9404 | Modality affects content, because P→◊P is valid, but ◊P→P isn't [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 8480 | S4: 'poss that poss that p' implies 'poss that p'; S5: 'poss that nec that p' implies 'nec that p' [Orenstein] |
| 7787 | Possible worlds logics use true-in-a-world rather than true [Girle] |
| 7788 | Modal logic has four basic modal negation equivalences [Girle] |
| 7796 | Modal logics were studied in terms of axioms, but now possible worlds semantics is added [Girle] |