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Single Idea 16463

[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity ]

Full Idea

Adams favours haecceitism about actual things but no haecceities for things that might exist but don't.

Gist of Idea

Adams says actual things have haecceities, but not things that only might exist

Source

report of Robert Merrihew Adams (Actualism and Thisness [1981]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.2

Book Ref

Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Mere Possibilities' [Princeton 2012], p.97


A Reaction

This contrasts with Plantinga, who proposes necessary essences for everything, even for what might exist. Plantinga sounds crazy to me, Adams merely interesting but not too plausible.

Related Idea

Idea 16469 Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]


The 13 ideas from Robert Merrihew Adams

Adams says actual things have haecceities, but not things that only might exist [Adams,RM, by Stalnaker]
Possible worlds are world-stories, maximal descriptions of whole non-existent worlds [Adams,RM, by Molnar]
Adams says anti-haecceitism reduces all thisness to suchness [Adams,RM, by Stalnaker]
Haecceitism may or may not involve some logical connection to essence [Adams,RM, by Mackie,P]
Are possible worlds just qualities, or do they include primitive identities as well? [Adams,RM]
A 'thisness' is a thing's property of being identical with itself (not the possession of self-identity) [Adams,RM]
Essences are taken to be qualitative properties [Adams,RM]
Direct reference is by proper names, or indexicals, or referential uses of descriptions [Adams,RM]
If the universe was cyclical, totally indiscernible events might occur from time to time [Adams,RM]
Two events might be indiscernible yet distinct, if there was a universe cyclical in time [Adams,RM]
Black's two globes might be one globe in highly curved space [Adams,RM]
Moderate Haecceitism says transworld identities are primitive, but connected to qualities [Adams,RM]
There are cases where mere qualities would not ensure an intrinsic identity [Adams,RM]