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Full Idea
Plantinga's critics worry that the metaphysics is actualist in name only, since it is achieved only by populating the actual world with entities whose nature is explained in terms of merely possible things that would exemplify them if anything did.
Gist of Idea
Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia
Source
comment on Alvin Plantinga (Actualism and Possible Worlds [1976]) by Robert C. Stalnaker - Mere Possibilities 4.4
Book Ref
Stalnaker,Robert C.: 'Mere Possibilities' [Princeton 2012], p.123
A Reaction
Plantinga seems a long way from the usual motivation for actualism, which is probably sceptical empiricism, and building a system on what is smack in front of you. Possibilities have to be true, though. That's why you need dispositions in actuality.
| 16376 | The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular [Peirce] |
| 11003 | The best version of reductionist actualism around is Armstrong's combinatorial account [Armstrong, by Read] |
| 16472 | Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga] |
| 18383 | Plantinga says there is just this world, with possibilities expressed in propositions [Plantinga, by Armstrong] |
| 16433 | Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker] |
| 11869 | Possible worlds rest on the objects about which we have suppositions [Wiggins] |
| 18415 | The actual world is just the world you are in [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
| 16441 | Lewis rejects actualism because he identifies properties with sets [Lewis, by Stalnaker] |
| 16282 | Ersatzers say we have one world, and abstract representations of how it might have been [Lewis] |
| 15791 | What are the ontological grounds for grouping possibilia into worlds? [Lycan on Lewis] |
| 15790 | Lewis can't know possible worlds without first knowing what is possible or impossible [Lycan on Lewis] |
| 10996 | Actualism is reductionist (to parts of actuality), or moderate realist (accepting real abstractions) [Read] |
| 16188 | Serious Actualism says there are no facts at all about something which doesn't exist [Simchen] |