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Single Idea 16506
[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
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Full Idea
We can expect that, for every completely determinate continuant, there will be at least one sortal concept that it falls under and that determines a principle of persistence for it.
Gist of Idea
Every determinate thing falls under a sortal, which fixes its persistence
Source
David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 2.4)
Book Ref
Wiggins,David: 'Sameness and Substance' [Blackwell 1980], p.60
A Reaction
I think he has the 'determines' relation the wrong way round! Being a tiger doesn't determine anything about persistence. It is having that nature and those persistence conditions which make it a tiger. And why does he optimistically 'expect' this?
The
29 ideas
from 'Sameness and Substance'
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16492
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Individuation needs accounts of identity, of change, and of singling out
[Wiggins]
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16493
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Individuation can only be understood by the relation between things and thinkers
[Wiggins]
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16496
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Singling out extends back and forward in time
[Wiggins]
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16495
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The only singling out is singling out 'as' something
[Wiggins]
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16494
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We want to explain sameness as coincidence of substance, not as anything qualitative
[Wiggins]
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17529
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Maybe the concept needed under which things coincide must also yield a principle of counting
[Wiggins]
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16497
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Leibniz's Law (not transitivity, symmetry, reflexivity) marks what is peculiar to identity
[Wiggins]
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16498
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Identity cannot be defined, because definitions are identities
[Wiggins]
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16499
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A restored church is the same 'church', but not the same 'building' or 'brickwork'
[Wiggins]
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16502
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Identity is primitive
[Wiggins]
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16503
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'What is it?' gives the kind, nature, persistence conditions and identity over time of a thing
[Wiggins]
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16501
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In Aristotle's sense, saying x falls under f is to say what x is
[Wiggins]
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16505
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By the principle of Indiscernibility, a symmetrical object could only be half of itself!
[Wiggins]
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16506
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Every determinate thing falls under a sortal, which fixes its persistence
[Wiggins]
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17530
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The sortal needed for identities may not always be sufficient to support counting
[Wiggins]
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16510
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Nominal essences don't fix membership, ignore evolution, and aren't contextual
[Wiggins]
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16509
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Natural kinds are well suited to be the sortals which fix substances
[Wiggins]
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16511
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A 'conception' of a horse is a full theory of what it is (and not just the 'concept')
[Wiggins]
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16512
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Semantic facts are preferable to transcendental philosophical fiction
[Wiggins]
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16515
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A thing begins only once; for a clock, it is when its making is first completed
[Wiggins]
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16514
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Artefacts are individuated by some matter having a certain function
[Wiggins]
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16517
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Priests prefer the working ship; antiquarians prefer the reconstruction
[Wiggins]
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16518
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We conceptualise objects, but they impinge on us
[Wiggins]
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16521
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A is necessarily A, so if B is A, then B is also necessarily A
[Wiggins]
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16522
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It is hard or impossible to think of Caesar as not human
[Wiggins]
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16523
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Realist Conceptualists accept that our interests affect our concepts
[Wiggins]
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16524
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Conceptualism says we must use our individuating concepts to grasp reality
[Wiggins]
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16525
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Our sortal concepts fix what we find in experience
[Wiggins]
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16526
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Animal classifications: the Emperor's, fabulous, innumerable, like flies, stray dogs, embalmed….
[Wiggins]
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