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Single Idea 16511

[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts ]

Full Idea

A 'conception' of horse is a theory of what a horse is, or what it is to be a horse. The conception is in no way the same as the concept. The conception is of the concept.

Gist of Idea

A 'conception' of a horse is a full theory of what it is (and not just the 'concept')

Source

David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 3.1)

Book Ref

Wiggins,David: 'Sameness and Substance' [Blackwell 1980], p.79


A Reaction

Wiggins sounds confident about a sharp distinction here, which I doubt, but some such distinction seems to required. I quite like Williams's 'fat' and 'thin' concepts.


The 16 ideas with the same theme [concepts as components of our theories of reality]:

The concept of 'green' involves a battery of other concepts [Sellars]
A 'conception' of a horse is a full theory of what it is (and not just the 'concept') [Wiggins]
The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor]
Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Peacocke, by Greco]
Theory-based concepts use rich models to show which similarities really matter [Gelman]
We do not learn concepts in isolation, but as an integrated part of broader knowledge [Murphy]
Concepts with familiar contents are easier to learn [Murphy]
Some knowledge is involved in instant use of categories, other knowledge in explanations [Murphy]
People categorise things consistent with their knowledge, even rejecting some good evidence [Murphy]
The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles [Margolis/Laurence]
The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts? [Margolis/Laurence]
The theory account is sometimes labelled as 'knowledge' or 'explanation' in approach [Machery]
Theory Theory says category concepts are knowledge stores explaining membership [Machery]
Theory Theory says concepts are explanatory knowledge, and concepts form domains [Machery]
Theory theorists rely on best explanation, rather than on similarities [Machery]
If categorisation is not by similarity, it seems to rely on what properties things might have [Machery]