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Single Idea 16514

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts ]

Full Idea

Ordinary artefacts are individuated, rather indeterminately and arbitrarily, by reference to a parcel of matter so organised as to subserve a certain function.

Gist of Idea

Artefacts are individuated by some matter having a certain function

Source

David Wiggins (Sameness and Substance [1980], 3.3)

Book Ref

Wiggins,David: 'Sameness and Substance' [Blackwell 1980], p.90


The 29 ideas from 'Sameness and Substance'

Individuation needs accounts of identity, of change, and of singling out [Wiggins]
Individuation can only be understood by the relation between things and thinkers [Wiggins]
Singling out extends back and forward in time [Wiggins]
The only singling out is singling out 'as' something [Wiggins]
We want to explain sameness as coincidence of substance, not as anything qualitative [Wiggins]
Maybe the concept needed under which things coincide must also yield a principle of counting [Wiggins]
Leibniz's Law (not transitivity, symmetry, reflexivity) marks what is peculiar to identity [Wiggins]
Identity cannot be defined, because definitions are identities [Wiggins]
A restored church is the same 'church', but not the same 'building' or 'brickwork' [Wiggins]
Identity is primitive [Wiggins]
'What is it?' gives the kind, nature, persistence conditions and identity over time of a thing [Wiggins]
In Aristotle's sense, saying x falls under f is to say what x is [Wiggins]
By the principle of Indiscernibility, a symmetrical object could only be half of itself! [Wiggins]
Every determinate thing falls under a sortal, which fixes its persistence [Wiggins]
The sortal needed for identities may not always be sufficient to support counting [Wiggins]
Nominal essences don't fix membership, ignore evolution, and aren't contextual [Wiggins]
Natural kinds are well suited to be the sortals which fix substances [Wiggins]
A 'conception' of a horse is a full theory of what it is (and not just the 'concept') [Wiggins]
Semantic facts are preferable to transcendental philosophical fiction [Wiggins]
A thing begins only once; for a clock, it is when its making is first completed [Wiggins]
Artefacts are individuated by some matter having a certain function [Wiggins]
Priests prefer the working ship; antiquarians prefer the reconstruction [Wiggins]
We conceptualise objects, but they impinge on us [Wiggins]
A is necessarily A, so if B is A, then B is also necessarily A [Wiggins]
It is hard or impossible to think of Caesar as not human [Wiggins]
Realist Conceptualists accept that our interests affect our concepts [Wiggins]
Conceptualism says we must use our individuating concepts to grasp reality [Wiggins]
Our sortal concepts fix what we find in experience [Wiggins]
Animal classifications: the Emperor's, fabulous, innumerable, like flies, stray dogs, embalmed…. [Wiggins]