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Full Idea
We can significantly ask what properties it is necessary for something to possess in order to be a thing of such and such a kind, since that asks what properties enter into the definition of the kind. But there is no such definition of the individual.
Gist of Idea
We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual
Source
A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], 9.A.5)
Book Ref
Ayer,A.J.: 'The Central Questions of Philosophy' [Penguin 1976], p.197
A Reaction
[Quoted, not surprisingly, by Wiggins] Illuminating. If essence is just about necessary properties, I begin to see why the sortal might be favoured. I take it to concern explanatory mechanisms, and hence the individual.
5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |