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Single Idea 16520

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences ]

Full Idea

We can significantly ask what properties it is necessary for something to possess in order to be a thing of such and such a kind, since that asks what properties enter into the definition of the kind. But there is no such definition of the individual.

Gist of Idea

We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual

Source

A.J. Ayer (The Central Questions of Philosophy [1973], 9.A.5)

Book Ref

Ayer,A.J.: 'The Central Questions of Philosophy' [Penguin 1976], p.197


A Reaction

[Quoted, not surprisingly, by Wiggins] Illuminating. If essence is just about necessary properties, I begin to see why the sortal might be favoured. I take it to concern explanatory mechanisms, and hence the individual.


The 13 ideas from 'The Central Questions of Philosophy'

Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer]
Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer]
Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer]
Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer]
Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer]
Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer]
Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer]
Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer]
You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer]
The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer]
We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer]
It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer]
Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer]