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Single Idea 16533

[filed under theme 10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity ]

Full Idea

If logically necessary truths are consequences of the laws of logic, then I think they are only a proper sub-class of the class of metaphysically necessary truths.

Clarification

A 'proper' sub-class must be smaller than the other class

Gist of Idea

Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities

Source

E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 1)

Book Ref

-: 'Mind' [-], p.2


A Reaction

The problem for this is unusual and bizarre systems of logic, or systems that contradict one another. This idea is only plausible if you talk about the truths derived from some roughly 'classical' core of logic. 'Tonk' won't do it!


The 19 ideas from 'What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths?'

Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities [Lowe]
'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity [Lowe]
'Epistemic' necessity is better called 'certainty' [Lowe]
'Intuitions' are just unreliable 'hunches'; over centuries intuitions change enormously [Lowe]
A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist [Lowe]
Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted [Lowe]
H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine [Lowe]
If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary [Lowe]
Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths [Lowe]
We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences [Lowe]
A definition of a circle will show what it is, and show its generating principle [Lowe]
Defining an ellipse by conic sections reveals necessities, but not the essence of an ellipse [Lowe]
An essence is what an entity is, revealed by a real definition; this is not an entity in its own right [Lowe]
Simple things like 'red' can be given real ostensive definitions [Lowe]
The essence of lumps and statues shows that two objects coincide but are numerically distinct [Lowe]
The essence of a bronze statue shows that it could be made of different bronze [Lowe]
Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition [Lowe]
If we must know some entity to know an essence, we lack a faculty to do that [Lowe]
Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about [Lowe]