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Single Idea 16534
[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
]
Full Idea
I suspect that 'intuitions' and 'hunches' are pretty much the same thing, and pretty useless as sources of knowledge. …Things that seemed intuitively true to our forebears a century or two ago often by no means seem intuitively true to us now.
Gist of Idea
'Intuitions' are just unreliable 'hunches'; over centuries intuitions change enormously
Source
E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 2)
Book Ref
-: 'Mind' [-], p.5
A Reaction
I don't accept this. Intuitions change a lot over the centuries because the reliable knowledge which informs intuitions has also changed a lot. Arguments and evidence may nail individual truths, but coherence must rest on intuition.
The
26 ideas
with the same theme
[direct awareness of knowledge]:
79
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Intuition grasps the definitions that can't be proved
[Aristotle]
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16111
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Aristotle wants to fit common intuitions, and therefore uses language as a guide
[Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
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12543
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Intuition gives us direct and certain knowledge of what is obvious
[Locke]
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8736
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Kantian intuitions are of particulars, and they give immediate knowledge
[Kant, by Shapiro]
|
16911
|
Intuition is a representation that depends on the presence of the object
[Kant]
|
23246
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Faith is not knowledge; it is a decision of the will
[Fichte]
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9185
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Bolzano wanted to avoid Kantian intuitions, and prove everything that could be proved
[Bolzano, by Dummett]
|
16900
|
Intuitions cannot be communicated
[Frege, by Burge]
|
14830
|
Intuition only recognises what is possible, not what exists or is certain
[Nietzsche]
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21221
|
Direct 'seeing' by consciousness is the ultimate rational legitimation
[Husserl]
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10040
|
Russell showed, through the paradoxes, that our basic logical intuitions are self-contradictory
[Russell/Whitehead, by Gödel]
|
11079
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How do I decide when to accept or obey an intuition?
[Wittgenstein]
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23957
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We often trust our intuitions as rational, despite their lack of reflection
[Solomon]
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4948
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Intuition is the strongest possible evidence one can have about anything
[Kripke]
|
13408
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Intuition and thought-experiments embody substantial information about the world
[Papineau]
|
23101
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Intuitions don't prove things; they just receptivity to interpretations
[Kekes]
|
16534
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'Intuitions' are just unreliable 'hunches'; over centuries intuitions change enormously
[Lowe]
|
9374
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If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long?
[Boghossian]
|
9592
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Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence
[Williamson]
|
20181
|
When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence
[Williamson]
|
20182
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The word 'intuitive' often plays not role at all in arguments, and can be removed
[Cappelen]
|
11077
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Intuition includes apriority, clarity, modality, authority, fallibility and no inferences
[Hanna]
|
11078
|
Intuition is only outside the 'space of reasons' if all reasons are inferential
[Hanna]
|
11080
|
Intuition is more like memory, imagination or understanding, than like perception
[Hanna]
|
14891
|
There is no reason to think our intuitions are good for science or metaphysics
[Ladyman/Ross]
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17734
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It is not enough that intuition be reliable - we need to know why it is reliable
[Jenkins]
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