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Single Idea 16535

[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts ]

Full Idea

The nearest I can get to a quick definition is to say that a concept is a way of thinking of some thing or kind of things, whether or not a really existent thing or kind of things.

Gist of Idea

A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist

Source

E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 2)

Book Ref

-: 'Mind' [-], p.6


A Reaction

The focus on 'things' seems rather narrow. Are relations things? He makes concepts sound adverbial, so that there is thinking going on, and then we add 'ways' of doing it. Thinking depends on concepts, not concepts on thinking.


The 28 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about concepts]:

Concepts are intellectual phantasms [Stoic school, by Ps-Plutarch]
Concepts are what unite a proposition [Leibniz]
Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind [Kant]
Either experience creates concepts, or concepts make experience possible [Kant]
Reason generates no concepts, but frees them from their link to experience in the understanding [Kant]
We don't think with concepts - we think the concepts [Hegel]
Active thought about objects produces the universal, which is what is true and essential of it [Hegel]
Every concept depends on the counter-concepts of what it is not [Hegel, by Bowie]
Infinities expand the bounds of the conceivable; we explore concepts to explore conceivability [Cantor, by Friend]
Concepts are rough groups of simultaneous sensations [Nietzsche]
Concepts don’t match one thing, but many things a little bit [Nietzsche]
Early Frege takes the extensions of concepts for granted [Frege, by Dummett]
A universal of which we are aware is called a 'concept' [Russell]
The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans]
The logical attitude tries to turn concepts into functions, when they are really forms or forces [Deleuze/Guattari]
'Sortal' concepts show kinds, use indefinite articles, and require grasping identities [Wright,C]
A concept is only a sortal if it gives genuine identity [Wright,C]
A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist [Lowe]
Our experience may be conceptual, but surely not the world itself? [Kusch]
Corresponding to every concept there is a class (some of them sets) [George/Velleman]
The main theories of concepts are exemplar, prototype and knowledge [Murphy]
Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents) [Recanati]
Concepts can be presented extensionally (as objects) or intensionally (as a characterization) [Friend]
For pragmatists a concept means its consequences [Macbeth]
Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses [Margolis/Laurence]
Concepts for categorisation and for induction may be quite different [Machery]
Concept theories aim at their knowledge, processes, format, acquisition, and location [Machery]
We should abandon 'concept', and just use 'prototype', 'exemplar' and 'theory' [Machery]