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Single Idea 16537

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities ]

Full Idea

If an essence is a sum of essential properties (had in all possible worlds where it exists), Fine points out that it seems grossly to overgenerate essential properties ('S is either a man or a mouse', or 'S is such that 2+2=4').

Gist of Idea

Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties

Source

report of Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994]) by E.J. Lowe - What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? 6

Book Ref

-: 'Mind' [-], p.16


A Reaction

To me this is the sort of mess you get into when you accept that 'being such that p' is a property. Defenders of the modal approach always have to eliminate 'trivial' properties from essences, but non-trivial is a defining feature of an essence.


The 21 ideas from 'Essence and Modality'

Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Fine,K, by Lowe]
An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami]
Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition' [Fine,K, by Rami]
An object is dependent if its essence prevents it from existing without some other object [Fine,K]
Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K]
My account shows how the concept works, rather than giving an analysis [Fine,K]
Modern philosophy has largely abandoned real definitions, apart from sortals [Fine,K]
Simple modal essentialism refers to necessary properties of an object [Fine,K]
Essentialist claims can be formulated more clearly with quantified modal logic [Fine,K]
Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is' [Fine,K]
The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa [Fine,K]
Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K]
It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold [Fine,K]
If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence [Fine,K]
Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects [Fine,K]
The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity [Fine,K]
Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa [Fine,K]
Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts [Fine,K]
Analytic truth may only be true in virtue of the meanings of certain terms [Fine,K]
The meaning of 'bachelor' is irrelevant to the meaning of 'unmarried man' [Fine,K]
Defining a term and giving the essence of an object don't just resemble - they are the same [Fine,K]