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Single Idea 16537
[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
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Full Idea
If an essence is a sum of essential properties (had in all possible worlds where it exists), Fine points out that it seems grossly to overgenerate essential properties ('S is either a man or a mouse', or 'S is such that 2+2=4').
Gist of Idea
Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties
Source
report of Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994]) by E.J. Lowe - What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? 6
Book Ref
-: 'Mind' [-], p.16
A Reaction
To me this is the sort of mess you get into when you accept that 'being such that p' is a property. Defenders of the modal approach always have to eliminate 'trivial' properties from essences, but non-trivial is a defining feature of an essence.
The
21 ideas
from 'Essence and Modality'
16537
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Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties
[Fine,K, by Lowe]
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10935
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An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing
[Fine,K, by Rami]
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10936
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Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition'
[Fine,K, by Rami]
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11151
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An object is dependent if its essence prevents it from existing without some other object
[Fine,K]
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11152
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Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties
[Fine,K]
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11159
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My account shows how the concept works, rather than giving an analysis
[Fine,K]
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11157
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Modern philosophy has largely abandoned real definitions, apart from sortals
[Fine,K]
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11160
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Simple modal essentialism refers to necessary properties of an object
[Fine,K]
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11158
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Essentialist claims can be formulated more clearly with quantified modal logic
[Fine,K]
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11161
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Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is'
[Fine,K]
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11163
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The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa
[Fine,K]
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11162
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Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence
[Fine,K]
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11164
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It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold
[Fine,K]
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11165
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If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence
[Fine,K]
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11168
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Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects
[Fine,K]
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11167
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Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa
[Fine,K]
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11166
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The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity
[Fine,K]
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11169
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Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts
[Fine,K]
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11170
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Analytic truth may only be true in virtue of the meanings of certain terms
[Fine,K]
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11172
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The meaning of 'bachelor' is irrelevant to the meaning of 'unmarried man'
[Fine,K]
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11171
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Defining a term and giving the essence of an object don't just resemble - they are the same
[Fine,K]
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