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Single Idea 16547

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism ]

Full Idea

It is not metaphysically necessary that water is composed of H2O molecules, because the natural laws governing the chemical behaviour of hydrogen and oxygen atoms could have been significantly different, so they might not have composed that substance.

Gist of Idea

H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine

Source

E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6)

Book Ref

-: 'Mind' [-], p.23


A Reaction

I fear this may be incoherent, as science. See Bird on why salt must dissolve in water. There can't (I suspect) be a law which keeps O and H the same, and yet makes them combine differently.


The 19 ideas from 'What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths?'

Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities [Lowe]
'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity [Lowe]
'Epistemic' necessity is better called 'certainty' [Lowe]
'Intuitions' are just unreliable 'hunches'; over centuries intuitions change enormously [Lowe]
A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist [Lowe]
Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted [Lowe]
H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine [Lowe]
If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary [Lowe]
Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths [Lowe]
We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences [Lowe]
A definition of a circle will show what it is, and show its generating principle [Lowe]
Defining an ellipse by conic sections reveals necessities, but not the essence of an ellipse [Lowe]
An essence is what an entity is, revealed by a real definition; this is not an entity in its own right [Lowe]
Simple things like 'red' can be given real ostensive definitions [Lowe]
The essence of lumps and statues shows that two objects coincide but are numerically distinct [Lowe]
The essence of a bronze statue shows that it could be made of different bronze [Lowe]
Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition [Lowe]
If we must know some entity to know an essence, we lack a faculty to do that [Lowe]
Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about [Lowe]