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Single Idea 16552
[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
]
Full Idea
If knowledge of essence were by acquaintance of a special kind of entity, we would doubt our ability to grasp the essence of things. For what faculty could be involved in this special kind of acquaintance?
Gist of Idea
If we must know some entity to know an essence, we lack a faculty to do that
Source
E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 7)
Book Ref
-: 'Mind' [-], p.28
A Reaction
This is Lockean empirical scepticism about essences, but I take the view that sometimes you can be acquainted with an essence, but more often you correctly infer it from you acquaintance - and this is just what scientists do.
The
198 ideas
from E.J. Lowe
18351
|
Propositions are made true, in virtue of something which explains its truth
[Lowe]
|
18352
|
Tropes have existence independently of any entities
[Lowe]
|
18353
|
Modes are beings that are related both to substances and to universals
[Lowe]
|
8967
|
Not all predicates can be properties - 'is non-self-exemplifying', for example
[Lowe]
|
8968
|
If the flagpole causally explains the shadow, the shadow cannot explain the flagpole
[Lowe]
|
8965
|
Neither mere matter nor pure form can individuate a sphere, so it must be a combination
[Lowe]
|
8966
|
Properties are facets of objects, only discussable separately by an act of abstraction
[Lowe]
|
15541
|
Maybe particles are unchanging, and intrinsic change in things is their rearrangement
[Lowe, by Lewis]
|
7710
|
Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation
[Lowe]
|
7711
|
Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object
[Lowe]
|
7712
|
On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities
[Lowe]
|
7714
|
Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic)
[Lowe]
|
7715
|
Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication
[Lowe]
|
7722
|
If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat"
[Lowe]
|
7720
|
Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal
[Lowe]
|
16063
|
Metaphysical necessity is logical necessity 'broadly construed'
[Lowe, by Lynch/Glasgow]
|
16414
|
Science needs metaphysics to weed out its presuppositions
[Lowe, by Hofweber]
|
8258
|
Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs
[Lowe]
|
9414
|
Metaphysics is the mapping of possibilities
[Lowe, by Mumford]
|
8260
|
Logical necessity can be 'strict' (laws), or 'narrow' (laws and definitions), or 'broad' (all logical worlds)
[Lowe]
|
8267
|
Perhaps concrete objects are entities which are in space-time and subject to causality
[Lowe]
|
8265
|
Our commitment to the existence of objects should depend on their explanatory value
[Lowe]
|
8263
|
An object is an entity which has identity-conditions
[Lowe]
|
8262
|
How can a theory of meaning show the ontological commitments of two paraphrases of one idea?
[Lowe]
|
8266
|
Simple counting is more basic than spotting that one-to-one correlation makes sets equinumerous
[Lowe]
|
8268
|
Some things (such as electrons) can be countable, while lacking proper identity
[Lowe]
|
8269
|
Points are limits of parts of space, so parts of space cannot be aggregates of them
[Lowe]
|
8270
|
Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects
[Lowe]
|
8271
|
An object 'endures' if it is always wholly present, and 'perdures' if different parts exist at different times
[Lowe]
|
8272
|
How can you identify temporal parts of tomatoes without referring to tomatoes?
[Lowe]
|
8273
|
Is 'the Thames is broad in London' relational, or adverbial, or segmental?
[Lowe]
|
8275
|
Objects are entities with full identity-conditions, but there are entities other than objects
[Lowe]
|
8276
|
Properties or qualities are essentially adjectival, not objectual
[Lowe]
|
8279
|
The identity of composite objects isn't fixed by original composition, because how do you identify the origin?
[Lowe]
|
8280
|
While space may just be appearance, time and change can't be, because the appearances change
[Lowe]
|
8283
|
Ontological categories are not natural kinds: the latter can only be distinguished using the former
[Lowe]
|
8281
|
Heraclitus says change is new creation, and Spinoza that it is just phases of the one substance
[Lowe]
|
8282
|
Only metaphysics can decide whether identity survives through change
[Lowe]
|
8284
|
The top division of categories is either abstract/concrete, or universal/particular, or necessary/contingent
[Lowe]
|
8285
|
I prefer 'modes' to 'tropes', because it emphasises their dependence
[Lowe]
|
8286
|
Tropes cannot have clear identity-conditions, so they are not objects
[Lowe]
|
8288
|
Sortal terms for universals involve a substance, whereas adjectival terms do not
[Lowe]
|
8290
|
One view is that two objects of the same type are only distinguished by differing in matter
[Lowe]
|
8292
|
Diversity of two tigers is their difference in space-time; difference of matter is a consequence
[Lowe]
|
8291
|
Individuation principles identify what kind it is; identity criteria distinguish items of the same kind
[Lowe]
|
8289
|
The idea that Cartesian souls are made of some ghostly 'immaterial' stuff is quite unwarranted
[Lowe]
|
8293
|
Real universals are needed to explain laws of nature
[Lowe]
|
8294
|
How can tropes depend on objects for their identity, if objects are just bundles of tropes?
[Lowe]
|
8295
|
Why cannot a trope float off and join another bundle?
[Lowe]
|
8296
|
Does a ball snug in plaster have one trope, or two which coincide?
[Lowe]
|
16127
|
Metaphysics tells us what there could be, rather than what there is
[Lowe]
|
16130
|
To be an object at all requires identity-conditions
[Lowe]
|
16128
|
A 'substance' is an object which doesn't depend for existence on other objects
[Lowe]
|
16131
|
The metaphysically possible is what acceptable principles and categories will permit
[Lowe]
|
15079
|
'Conceptual' necessity is narrow logical necessity, true because of concepts and logical laws
[Lowe]
|
8298
|
Sets are instances of numbers (rather than 'collections'); numbers explain sets, not vice versa
[Lowe]
|
8297
|
Numbers are universals, being sets whose instances are sets of appropriate cardinality
[Lowe]
|
8299
|
Abstractions are non-spatial, or dependent, or derived from concepts
[Lowe]
|
8300
|
Perhaps possession of causal power is the hallmark of existence (and a reason to deny the void)
[Lowe]
|
8301
|
Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them
[Lowe]
|
8302
|
Fs and Gs are identical in number if they one-to-one correlate with one another
[Lowe]
|
8305
|
A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it
[Lowe]
|
8303
|
Criteria of identity cannot individuate objects, because they are shared among different types
[Lowe]
|
8306
|
You can think of a direction without a line, but a direction existing with no lines is inconceivable
[Lowe]
|
8307
|
Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables
[Lowe]
|
8308
|
Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations
[Lowe]
|
8309
|
A set is a 'number of things', not a 'collection', because nothing actually collects the members
[Lowe]
|
8310
|
Does the existence of numbers matter, in the way space, time and persons do?
[Lowe]
|
8311
|
If 2 is a particular, then adding particulars to themselves does nothing, and 2+2=2
[Lowe]
|
8312
|
It is better if the existential quantifier refers to 'something', rather than a 'thing' which needs individuation
[Lowe]
|
8313
|
Facts are needed for truth-making and causation, but they seem to lack identity criteria
[Lowe]
|
8315
|
Maybe facts are just true propositions
[Lowe]
|
8314
|
Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents?
[Lowe]
|
8316
|
Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations
[Lowe]
|
8317
|
To cite facts as the elements in causation is to confuse states of affairs with states of objects
[Lowe]
|
8318
|
The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents
[Lowe]
|
8319
|
One-to-one correspondence would need countable, individuable items
[Lowe]
|
8320
|
Does every abstract possible world exist in every possible world?
[Lowe]
|
8321
|
All possible worlds contain abstracta (e.g. numbers), which means they contain concrete objects
[Lowe]
|
8322
|
I don't believe in the empty set, because (lacking members) it lacks identity-conditions
[Lowe]
|
8323
|
It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast?
[Lowe]
|
13122
|
Lowe divides things into universals and particulars, then kinds and properties, and abstract/concrete
[Lowe, by Westerhoff]
|
6617
|
The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties?
[Lowe]
|
6631
|
If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers?
[Lowe]
|
6618
|
A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change
[Lowe]
|
6619
|
Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining'
[Lowe]
|
6626
|
'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires
[Lowe]
|
6625
|
If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them?
[Lowe]
|
6621
|
You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief
[Lowe]
|
6623
|
Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion
[Lowe]
|
6628
|
Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties
[Lowe]
|
6629
|
Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies'
[Lowe]
|
6622
|
Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain
[Lowe]
|
6630
|
Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes
[Lowe]
|
6636
|
The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory
[Lowe]
|
6633
|
Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical
[Lowe]
|
6634
|
Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states)
[Lowe]
|
6632
|
The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief
[Lowe]
|
6635
|
Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future
[Lowe]
|
6637
|
How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially?
[Lowe]
|
6642
|
Psychologists say illusions only occur in unnatural and passive situations
[Lowe]
|
6645
|
If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong
[Lowe]
|
6639
|
The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common
[Lowe]
|
6640
|
A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external
[Lowe]
|
6643
|
'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality
[Lowe]
|
6638
|
One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form
[Lowe]
|
6644
|
Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information
[Lowe]
|
6646
|
The brain may have two systems for vision, with only the older one intact in blindsight
[Lowe]
|
6641
|
Externalists say minds depend on environment for their very existence and identity
[Lowe]
|
6648
|
Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech
[Lowe]
|
6647
|
Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation
[Lowe]
|
6653
|
Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth
[Lowe]
|
6651
|
People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event
[Lowe]
|
6652
|
'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background
[Lowe]
|
6655
|
The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge
[Lowe]
|
6656
|
The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods
[Lowe]
|
6654
|
A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual
[Lowe]
|
6657
|
Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity
[Lowe]
|
6659
|
The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent
[Lowe]
|
6661
|
Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation
[Lowe]
|
6662
|
We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice
[Lowe]
|
6663
|
People's actions are explained either by their motives, or their reasons, or the causes
[Lowe]
|
6666
|
All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I'
[Lowe]
|
6665
|
Persons are selves - subjects of experience, with reflexive self-knowledge
[Lowe]
|
6670
|
If my brain could survive on its own, I cannot be identical with my whole body
[Lowe]
|
6671
|
It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation
[Lowe]
|
6667
|
There are memories of facts, memories of practical skills, and autobiographical memory
[Lowe]
|
16533
|
Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities
[Lowe]
|
16531
|
'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity
[Lowe]
|
16532
|
'Epistemic' necessity is better called 'certainty'
[Lowe]
|
16534
|
'Intuitions' are just unreliable 'hunches'; over centuries intuitions change enormously
[Lowe]
|
16535
|
A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist
[Lowe]
|
16547
|
H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine
[Lowe]
|
16543
|
If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary
[Lowe]
|
16544
|
Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths
[Lowe]
|
16538
|
We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences
[Lowe]
|
16542
|
Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted
[Lowe]
|
16545
|
The essence of lumps and statues shows that two objects coincide but are numerically distinct
[Lowe]
|
16546
|
The essence of a bronze statue shows that it could be made of different bronze
[Lowe]
|
16539
|
A definition of a circle will show what it is, and show its generating principle
[Lowe]
|
16540
|
Defining an ellipse by conic sections reveals necessities, but not the essence of an ellipse
[Lowe]
|
16548
|
An essence is what an entity is, revealed by a real definition; this is not an entity in its own right
[Lowe]
|
16549
|
Simple things like 'red' can be given real ostensive definitions
[Lowe]
|
16551
|
Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition
[Lowe]
|
16552
|
If we must know some entity to know an essence, we lack a faculty to do that
[Lowe]
|
16550
|
Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about
[Lowe]
|
14581
|
The normative view says laws show the natural behaviour of natural kind members
[Lowe, by Mumford/Anjum]
|
4205
|
'Is non-self-exemplifying' is a predicate which cannot denote a property (as it would be a contradiction)
[Lowe]
|
4195
|
It is impossible to reach a valid false conclusion from true premises, so reason itself depends on possibility
[Lowe]
|
4206
|
Conventionalists see the world as an amorphous lump without identities, but are we part of the lump?
[Lowe]
|
4207
|
We might eliminate 'possible' and 'necessary' in favour of quantification over possible worlds
[Lowe]
|
4196
|
The main categories of existence are either universal and particular, or abstract and concrete
[Lowe]
|
4197
|
The category of universals can be sub-divided into properties and relations
[Lowe]
|
4208
|
'If he wasn't born he wouldn't have died' doesn't mean birth causes death, so causation isn't counterfactual
[Lowe]
|
4209
|
The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration
[Lowe]
|
4210
|
If the concept of a cause says it precedes its effect, that rules out backward causation by definition
[Lowe]
|
4211
|
Causal overdetermination is either actual overdetermination, or pre-emption, or the fail-safe case
[Lowe]
|
4212
|
Hume showed that causation could at most be natural necessity, never metaphysical necessity
[Lowe]
|
4213
|
Causation may be instances of laws (seen either as constant conjunctions, or as necessities)
[Lowe]
|
4214
|
Maybe such concepts as causation, identity and existence are primitive and irreducible
[Lowe]
|
4194
|
Metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental structure of reality as a whole
[Lowe]
|
4193
|
The behaviour of persons and social groups seems to need rational rather than causal explanation
[Lowe]
|
4215
|
It seems proper to say that only substances (rather than events) have causal powers
[Lowe]
|
4217
|
It is more extravagant, in general, to revise one's logic than to augment one's ontology
[Lowe]
|
4219
|
Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can coincide in space and time
[Lowe]
|
4220
|
Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time
[Lowe]
|
4221
|
Maybe modern physics requires an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology
[Lowe]
|
4222
|
If all that exists is what is being measured, what about the people and instruments doing the measuring?
[Lowe]
|
4223
|
Unfalsifiability may be a failure in an empirical theory, but it is a virtue in metaphysics
[Lowe]
|
4224
|
If motion is change of distance between objects, it involves no intrinsic change in the objects
[Lowe]
|
4225
|
Events are changes in the properties of or relations between things
[Lowe]
|
4227
|
Surfaces, lines and points are not, strictly speaking, parts of space, but 'limits', which are abstract
[Lowe]
|
4198
|
If 5% replacement preserves a ship, we can replace 4% and 4% again, and still retain the ship
[Lowe]
|
4228
|
If space is entirely relational, what makes a boundary, or a place unoccupied by physical objects?
[Lowe]
|
4199
|
A renovation or a reconstruction of an original ship would be accepted, as long as the other one didn't exist
[Lowe]
|
4229
|
An infinite series of tasks can't be completed because it has no last member
[Lowe]
|
4200
|
If old parts are stored and then appropriated, they are no longer part of the original (which is the renovated ship).
[Lowe]
|
4232
|
Nominalists believe that only particulars exist
[Lowe]
|
4233
|
If 'blueness' is a set of particulars, there is danger of circularity, or using universals, in identifying the set
[Lowe]
|
4234
|
Trope theory says blueness is a real feature of objects, but not the same as an identical blue found elsewhere
[Lowe]
|
4235
|
Maybe a cushion is just a bundle of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness
[Lowe]
|
4236
|
Tropes seem to be abstract entities, because they can't exist alone, but must come in bundles
[Lowe]
|
4237
|
Concrete and abstract objects are distinct because the former have causal powers and relations
[Lowe]
|
4238
|
The centre of mass of the solar system is a non-causal abstract object, despite having a location
[Lowe]
|
4239
|
Nominalists deny abstract objects, because we can have no reason to believe in their existence
[Lowe]
|
4240
|
It might be argued that mathematics does not, or should not, aim at truth
[Lowe]
|
4241
|
If there are infinite numbers and finite concrete objects, this implies that numbers are abstract objects
[Lowe]
|
4201
|
Four theories of qualitative change are 'a is F now', or 'a is F-at-t', or 'a-at-t is F', or 'a is-at-t F'
[Lowe, by PG]
|
4202
|
Change can be of composition (the component parts), or quality (properties), or substance
[Lowe]
|
4203
|
Identity of Indiscernibles (same properties, same thing) ) is not Leibniz's Law (same thing, same properties)
[Lowe]
|
4204
|
Statues can't survive much change to their shape, unlike lumps of bronze, which must retain material
[Lowe]
|
7783
|
Bodies, properties, relations, events, numbers, sets and propositions are 'things' if they exist
[Lowe]
|
13917
|
Metaphysics aims to identify categories of being, and show their interdependency
[Lowe]
|
13919
|
Philosophy aims not at the 'analysis of concepts', but at understanding the essences of things
[Lowe]
|
13918
|
Holes, shadows and spots of light can coincide without being identical
[Lowe]
|
13921
|
All things must have an essence (a 'what it is'), or we would be unable to think about them
[Lowe]
|
13922
|
Knowing an essence is just knowing what the thing is, not knowing some further thing
[Lowe]
|
13920
|
Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category
[Lowe]
|