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Single Idea 16553

[filed under theme 14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism ]

Full Idea

We emphasise the activities in mechanisms. This is explicitly dualist. Substantivalists speak of entities with dispositions to act. Process ontologists reify activities and try to reduce entities to processes. We try to capture both intuitions.

Gist of Idea

Our account of mechanism combines both entities and activities

Source

Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 3)

Book Ref

-: 'Philosophy of Science' [-], p.4


A Reaction

[A quotation of selected fragments] The problem here seems to be the raising of an 'activity' to a central role in ontology, when it doesn't seem to be primitive, and will typically be analysed in a variety of ways.

Related Idea

Idea 16554 Activities have place, rate, duration, entities, properties, modes, direction, polarity, energy and range [Machamer/Darden/Craver]


The 13 ideas from Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C

Mechanisms are not just push-pull systems [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
Mechanisms are systems organised to produce regular change [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
A mechanism explains a phenomenon by showing how it was produced [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
Our account of mechanism combines both entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
Activities have place, rate, duration, entities, properties, modes, direction, polarity, energy and range [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
Functions are not properties of objects, they are activities contributing to mechanisms [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
Penicillin causes nothing; the cause is what penicillin does [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
Laws of nature have very little application in biology [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
Descriptions of explanatory mechanisms have a bottom level, where going further is irrelevant [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
We can abstract by taking an exemplary case and ignoring the detail [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
The explanation is not the regularity, but the activity sustaining it [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
There are four types of bottom-level activities which will explain phenomena [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
We understand something by presenting its low-level entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]