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Single Idea 16574
[filed under theme 9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 10. Beginning of an Object
]
Full Idea
We agree that nothing can be said without qualification to come from what is not, …but it may in a qualified sense. For a thing comes to be from a privation, which in its own nature is not-being - this not surviving as a constituent in the result.
Clarification
A 'privation' is an absence of something
Gist of Idea
Coming-to-be may be from nothing in a qualified way, as arising from an absence
Source
Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 191b13)
Book Ref
Aristotle: 'The Basic Works of Aristotle', ed/tr. McKeon,Richard [Modern Library Classics 2001], p.234
A Reaction
Not sure I understand this, but it seems to say that genuine creation from nothing at all is impossible.
The
94 ideas
from 'Physics'
17464
|
When Aristotle's elements compound they are stable, so why would they ever separate?
[Weisberg/Needham/Hendry on Aristotle]
|
11252
|
The 'form' of a thing explains why the matter constitutes that particular thing
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
11253
|
A 'material' cause/explanation is the form of whatever is the source
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
22885
|
For Aristotle time is not a process but a means for measuring processes
[Aristotle, by Bardon]
|
22929
|
Aristotle's infinity is a property of the counting process, that it has no natural limit
[Aristotle, by Le Poidevin]
|
22930
|
Lengths do not contain infinite parts; parts are created by acts of division
[Aristotle, by Le Poidevin]
|
11255
|
In feature-generation the matter (such as bronze) endures, but in generation it doesn't
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
16972
|
The four explanations are the main aspects of a thing's nature
[Aristotle, by Moravcsik]
|
11254
|
Matter is potentiality
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
11250
|
Four Explanations: the essence and form; the matter; the source; and the end
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
12045
|
Aristotle's four 'causes' are four items which figure in basic explanations of nature
[Aristotle, by Annas]
|
5080
|
We know a thing if we grasp its first causes, principles and basic elements
[Aristotle]
|
9071
|
We first sense whole entities, and then move to particular parts of it
[Aristotle]
|
13270
|
Are a part and whole one or many? Either way, what is the cause?
[Aristotle]
|
16644
|
The features of a thing (whether quality or quantity) are inseparable from their subjects
[Aristotle]
|
5082
|
Reason grasps generalities, while the senses grasp particulars
[Aristotle]
|
16104
|
Unity of the form is just unity of the definition
[Aristotle]
|
16172
|
Substance is not predicated of anything - but it still has something underlying it, that originates it
[Aristotle]
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16173
|
Coming to be is by shape-change, addition, subtraction, composition or alteration
[Aristotle]
|
16174
|
A nature is related to a substance as shapeless matter is to something which has a shape
[Aristotle]
|
16623
|
We only infer underlying natures by analogy, observing bronze of a statue, or wood of a bed
[Aristotle]
|
5083
|
Do things come to be from what is, or from what is not? Both seem problematical.
[Aristotle]
|
16574
|
Coming-to-be may be from nothing in a qualified way, as arising from an absence
[Aristotle]
|
16762
|
Matter desires form, as female desires male, and ugliness desires beauty
[Aristotle]
|
17041
|
Natural objects include animals and their parts, plants, and the simple elements
[Aristotle]
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17042
|
Natural things are their own source of stability through change
[Aristotle]
|
5084
|
A thing's nature is what causes its changes and stability
[Aristotle]
|
17043
|
Form, not matter, is a thing's nature, because it is actual, rather than potential
[Aristotle]
|
9787
|
Scientists must know the essential attributes of the things they study
[Aristotle]
|
9788
|
Mathematicians study what is conceptually separable, and doesn't lead to error
[Aristotle]
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9789
|
You can't abstract natural properties to make Forms - objects and attributes are defined together
[Aristotle]
|
9790
|
Geometry studies naturally occurring lines, but not as they occur in nature
[Aristotle]
|
5085
|
'Nature' refers to two things - form and matter
[Aristotle]
|
5086
|
The nature of a thing is its end and purpose
[Aristotle]
|
5087
|
A thing's purpose is ambiguous, and from one point of view we ourselves are ends
[Aristotle]
|
8331
|
To know something we need understanding, which is grasp of the primary cause
[Aristotle]
|
8332
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The four causes are the material, the form, the source, and the end
[Aristotle]
|
20042
|
We assign the cause of someone's walking when we say why they are doing it
[Aristotle]
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13106
|
Maybe there is no pure chance; a man's choices cause his chance meetings
[Aristotle]
|
13107
|
Causes produce a few things in their own right, and innumerable things coincidentally
[Aristotle]
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13108
|
Chance is a coincidental cause among events involving purpose and choice
[Aristotle]
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13109
|
Chance is inexplicable, because we can only explain what happens always or usually
[Aristotle]
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13110
|
Intrinsic cause is prior to coincidence, so nature and intelligence are primary causes, chance secondary
[Aristotle]
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16968
|
There are as many causes/explanations as there are different types of why-question
[Aristotle]
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16969
|
Science refers the question Why? to four causes/explanations: matter, form, source, purpose
[Aristotle]
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16970
|
A thing's form and purpose are often the same, and form can be the initiator of change too
[Aristotle]
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17262
|
Aristotle's formal and material 'becauses' [aitiai] arguably involve grounding
[Aristotle, by Correia/Schnieder]
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5089
|
Nature has purpose, and aims at what is better. Is it coincidence that crops grow when it rains?
[Aristotle]
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5091
|
Teeth and crops are predictable, so they cannot be mere chance, but must have a purpose
[Aristotle]
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5092
|
Nature is a principle of change, so we must understand change first
[Aristotle]
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5093
|
Continuity depends on infinity, because the continuous is infinitely divisible
[Aristotle]
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16115
|
Change is the implied actuality of that which exists potentially
[Aristotle]
|
20063
|
Motion fulfils potentiality
[Aristotle]
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16656
|
The separation from here to there is not the same as the separation from there to here
[Aristotle]
|
5095
|
The heavens seem to be infinite, because we cannot imagine their end
[Aristotle]
|
16691
|
A day, or the games, has one thing after another, actually and potentially occurring
[Aristotle]
|
18090
|
Without infinity time has limits, magnitudes are indivisible, and numbers come to an end
[Aristotle]
|
5097
|
If everything has a place, this causes an infinite regress, because each place must have place
[Aristotle]
|
16791
|
There is no whole except for the parts
[Aristotle]
|
5098
|
Place is not shape, or matter, or extension between limits; it is the limits of a body
[Aristotle]
|
5099
|
The universe as a whole is not anywhere
[Aristotle]
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22956
|
How can time exist, when it is composed of what has ceased to be and is yet to be?
[Aristotle]
|
5102
|
If all of time has either ceased to exist, or has not yet happened, maybe time does not exist
[Aristotle]
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16693
|
Time has parts, but the now is not one of them, and time is not composed of nows
[Aristotle]
|
22957
|
We can't tell whether the changing present moment is one thing, or a succession of things
[Aristotle]
|
22958
|
Nows can't be linked together, any more than points on a line
[Aristotle]
|
22916
|
Unlike time, change goes at different rates, and is usually localised
[Aristotle, by Le Poidevin]
|
5103
|
Time is not change, but requires change in our minds to be noticed
[Aristotle]
|
20920
|
If there were many cosmoses, each would have its own time, giving many times
[Aristotle]
|
8590
|
Time does not exist without change
[Aristotle]
|
5104
|
Time is an aspect of change
[Aristotle]
|
22959
|
Time is not change, but the number we associate with change
[Aristotle]
|
22960
|
The sophists thought a man in the Lyceum is different from that man in the marketplace
[Aristotle]
|
22961
|
The present moment is obviously a necessary feature of time
[Aristotle]
|
22962
|
Two is the least number, but there is no least magnitude, because it is always divisible
[Aristotle]
|
22963
|
We measure change by time, and time by change, as they are interdefined
[Aristotle]
|
22964
|
Change only exists in time through its being temporally measure
[Aristotle]
|
22965
|
Time measures rest, as well as change
[Aristotle]
|
5105
|
The incommensurability of the diagonal always exists, and so it is not in time
[Aristotle]
|
22966
|
The present moment is a link (of past to future), and also a limit (of past and of future)
[Aristotle]
|
5106
|
Would there be time if there were no mind?
[Aristotle]
|
22967
|
It is unclear whether time depends on the existence of soul
[Aristotle]
|
22968
|
Circular motion is the most obvious measure of time, and especially the celestial sphere
[Aristotle]
|
9974
|
Ten sheep and ten dogs are the same numerically, but it is not the same ten
[Aristotle]
|
5107
|
Predicates are substance, quality, place, relation, quantity and action or affection
[Aristotle]
|
5108
|
Is ceasing-to-be unnatural if it happens by force, and natural otherwise?
[Aristotle]
|
18833
|
A continuous line cannot be composed of indivisible points
[Aristotle]
|
5110
|
Goodness is when a thing (such as a circle) is complete, and conforms with its nature
[Aristotle]
|
5111
|
All moral virtue is concerned with bodily pleasure and pain
[Aristotle]
|
5113
|
Nothing natural is disorderly, because nature is responsible for all order
[Aristotle]
|
5114
|
If movement can arise within an animal, why can't it also arise in the universe?
[Aristotle]
|
5116
|
When there is unnatural movement (e.g. fire going downwards) the cause is obvious
[Aristotle]
|
5117
|
Heavy and light are defined by their tendency to move down or up
[Aristotle]
|
5119
|
The source of all movement must be indivisible and have no magnitude
[Aristotle]
|