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Single Idea 16623
[filed under theme 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
]
Full Idea
The underlying nature is an object of knowledge, by an analogy. For as bronze is to a statue, wood to a bed, or matter and the formless before receiving form to any thing which has form, so is the underlying nature of substance, the 'this' or existent.
Gist of Idea
We only infer underlying natures by analogy, observing bronze of a statue, or wood of a bed
Source
Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 191a08)
Book Ref
Aristotle: 'The Basic Works of Aristotle', ed/tr. McKeon,Richard [Modern Library Classics 2001], p.232
A Reaction
Scholastics were perfectly aware of this cautious approach. It is only the critics who jeer at Aristotelians for claiming to know all about the essences of things. Essence is like the Unmoved Mover, inferred but unknown.
The
94 ideas
from 'Physics'
17464
|
When Aristotle's elements compound they are stable, so why would they ever separate?
[Weisberg/Needham/Hendry on Aristotle]
|
11252
|
The 'form' of a thing explains why the matter constitutes that particular thing
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
11253
|
A 'material' cause/explanation is the form of whatever is the source
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
22885
|
For Aristotle time is not a process but a means for measuring processes
[Aristotle, by Bardon]
|
22929
|
Aristotle's infinity is a property of the counting process, that it has no natural limit
[Aristotle, by Le Poidevin]
|
22930
|
Lengths do not contain infinite parts; parts are created by acts of division
[Aristotle, by Le Poidevin]
|
11255
|
In feature-generation the matter (such as bronze) endures, but in generation it doesn't
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
16972
|
The four explanations are the main aspects of a thing's nature
[Aristotle, by Moravcsik]
|
11254
|
Matter is potentiality
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
11250
|
Four Explanations: the essence and form; the matter; the source; and the end
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
12045
|
Aristotle's four 'causes' are four items which figure in basic explanations of nature
[Aristotle, by Annas]
|
5080
|
We know a thing if we grasp its first causes, principles and basic elements
[Aristotle]
|
9071
|
We first sense whole entities, and then move to particular parts of it
[Aristotle]
|
13270
|
Are a part and whole one or many? Either way, what is the cause?
[Aristotle]
|
16644
|
The features of a thing (whether quality or quantity) are inseparable from their subjects
[Aristotle]
|
5082
|
Reason grasps generalities, while the senses grasp particulars
[Aristotle]
|
16104
|
Unity of the form is just unity of the definition
[Aristotle]
|
16172
|
Substance is not predicated of anything - but it still has something underlying it, that originates it
[Aristotle]
|
16173
|
Coming to be is by shape-change, addition, subtraction, composition or alteration
[Aristotle]
|
16174
|
A nature is related to a substance as shapeless matter is to something which has a shape
[Aristotle]
|
16623
|
We only infer underlying natures by analogy, observing bronze of a statue, or wood of a bed
[Aristotle]
|
5083
|
Do things come to be from what is, or from what is not? Both seem problematical.
[Aristotle]
|
16574
|
Coming-to-be may be from nothing in a qualified way, as arising from an absence
[Aristotle]
|
16762
|
Matter desires form, as female desires male, and ugliness desires beauty
[Aristotle]
|
17041
|
Natural objects include animals and their parts, plants, and the simple elements
[Aristotle]
|
17042
|
Natural things are their own source of stability through change
[Aristotle]
|
5084
|
A thing's nature is what causes its changes and stability
[Aristotle]
|
17043
|
Form, not matter, is a thing's nature, because it is actual, rather than potential
[Aristotle]
|
9787
|
Scientists must know the essential attributes of the things they study
[Aristotle]
|
9788
|
Mathematicians study what is conceptually separable, and doesn't lead to error
[Aristotle]
|
9789
|
You can't abstract natural properties to make Forms - objects and attributes are defined together
[Aristotle]
|
9790
|
Geometry studies naturally occurring lines, but not as they occur in nature
[Aristotle]
|
5085
|
'Nature' refers to two things - form and matter
[Aristotle]
|
5086
|
The nature of a thing is its end and purpose
[Aristotle]
|
5087
|
A thing's purpose is ambiguous, and from one point of view we ourselves are ends
[Aristotle]
|
8331
|
To know something we need understanding, which is grasp of the primary cause
[Aristotle]
|
8332
|
The four causes are the material, the form, the source, and the end
[Aristotle]
|
20042
|
We assign the cause of someone's walking when we say why they are doing it
[Aristotle]
|
13106
|
Maybe there is no pure chance; a man's choices cause his chance meetings
[Aristotle]
|
13107
|
Causes produce a few things in their own right, and innumerable things coincidentally
[Aristotle]
|
13108
|
Chance is a coincidental cause among events involving purpose and choice
[Aristotle]
|
13109
|
Chance is inexplicable, because we can only explain what happens always or usually
[Aristotle]
|
13110
|
Intrinsic cause is prior to coincidence, so nature and intelligence are primary causes, chance secondary
[Aristotle]
|
16968
|
There are as many causes/explanations as there are different types of why-question
[Aristotle]
|
16969
|
Science refers the question Why? to four causes/explanations: matter, form, source, purpose
[Aristotle]
|
16970
|
A thing's form and purpose are often the same, and form can be the initiator of change too
[Aristotle]
|
17262
|
Aristotle's formal and material 'becauses' [aitiai] arguably involve grounding
[Aristotle, by Correia/Schnieder]
|
5089
|
Nature has purpose, and aims at what is better. Is it coincidence that crops grow when it rains?
[Aristotle]
|
5091
|
Teeth and crops are predictable, so they cannot be mere chance, but must have a purpose
[Aristotle]
|
5092
|
Nature is a principle of change, so we must understand change first
[Aristotle]
|
5093
|
Continuity depends on infinity, because the continuous is infinitely divisible
[Aristotle]
|
16115
|
Change is the implied actuality of that which exists potentially
[Aristotle]
|
20063
|
Motion fulfils potentiality
[Aristotle]
|
16656
|
The separation from here to there is not the same as the separation from there to here
[Aristotle]
|
5095
|
The heavens seem to be infinite, because we cannot imagine their end
[Aristotle]
|
16691
|
A day, or the games, has one thing after another, actually and potentially occurring
[Aristotle]
|
18090
|
Without infinity time has limits, magnitudes are indivisible, and numbers come to an end
[Aristotle]
|
5097
|
If everything has a place, this causes an infinite regress, because each place must have place
[Aristotle]
|
16791
|
There is no whole except for the parts
[Aristotle]
|
5098
|
Place is not shape, or matter, or extension between limits; it is the limits of a body
[Aristotle]
|
5099
|
The universe as a whole is not anywhere
[Aristotle]
|
22956
|
How can time exist, when it is composed of what has ceased to be and is yet to be?
[Aristotle]
|
5102
|
If all of time has either ceased to exist, or has not yet happened, maybe time does not exist
[Aristotle]
|
16693
|
Time has parts, but the now is not one of them, and time is not composed of nows
[Aristotle]
|
22957
|
We can't tell whether the changing present moment is one thing, or a succession of things
[Aristotle]
|
22958
|
Nows can't be linked together, any more than points on a line
[Aristotle]
|
22916
|
Unlike time, change goes at different rates, and is usually localised
[Aristotle, by Le Poidevin]
|
5103
|
Time is not change, but requires change in our minds to be noticed
[Aristotle]
|
20920
|
If there were many cosmoses, each would have its own time, giving many times
[Aristotle]
|
8590
|
Time does not exist without change
[Aristotle]
|
5104
|
Time is an aspect of change
[Aristotle]
|
22959
|
Time is not change, but the number we associate with change
[Aristotle]
|
22960
|
The sophists thought a man in the Lyceum is different from that man in the marketplace
[Aristotle]
|
22961
|
The present moment is obviously a necessary feature of time
[Aristotle]
|
22962
|
Two is the least number, but there is no least magnitude, because it is always divisible
[Aristotle]
|
22963
|
We measure change by time, and time by change, as they are interdefined
[Aristotle]
|
22964
|
Change only exists in time through its being temporally measure
[Aristotle]
|
22965
|
Time measures rest, as well as change
[Aristotle]
|
5105
|
The incommensurability of the diagonal always exists, and so it is not in time
[Aristotle]
|
22966
|
The present moment is a link (of past to future), and also a limit (of past and of future)
[Aristotle]
|
5106
|
Would there be time if there were no mind?
[Aristotle]
|
22967
|
It is unclear whether time depends on the existence of soul
[Aristotle]
|
22968
|
Circular motion is the most obvious measure of time, and especially the celestial sphere
[Aristotle]
|
9974
|
Ten sheep and ten dogs are the same numerically, but it is not the same ten
[Aristotle]
|
5107
|
Predicates are substance, quality, place, relation, quantity and action or affection
[Aristotle]
|
5108
|
Is ceasing-to-be unnatural if it happens by force, and natural otherwise?
[Aristotle]
|
18833
|
A continuous line cannot be composed of indivisible points
[Aristotle]
|
5110
|
Goodness is when a thing (such as a circle) is complete, and conforms with its nature
[Aristotle]
|
5111
|
All moral virtue is concerned with bodily pleasure and pain
[Aristotle]
|
5113
|
Nothing natural is disorderly, because nature is responsible for all order
[Aristotle]
|
5114
|
If movement can arise within an animal, why can't it also arise in the universe?
[Aristotle]
|
5116
|
When there is unnatural movement (e.g. fire going downwards) the cause is obvious
[Aristotle]
|
5117
|
Heavy and light are defined by their tendency to move down or up
[Aristotle]
|
5119
|
The source of all movement must be indivisible and have no magnitude
[Aristotle]
|