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Single Idea 16636

[filed under theme 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique ]

Full Idea

To me a die seems to be nothing distinct from those things which are termed its modes or accidents. And to say a die is hard, extended and square is not to attribute those qualities to a distinct subject, but only an explication of the word 'die'.

Gist of Idea

A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents

Source

George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], n 49)

Book Ref

'A Companion to Metaphysics', ed/tr. Kim,Jaegwon/Sosa,Ernest [Blackwell 1995], p.65

A Reaction

This is apparently a reaction to Locke, and a final rejection of the medieval idea of a 'substance'. Unfortunately it leaves Berkeley with a 'bundle' view of objects (a typical empiricist account), which is even worse.

The 33 ideas from 'The Principles of Human Knowledge'

18876 Berkeley does believe in trees, but is confused about what trees are [Berkeley, by Cameron]
6495 Berkeley's idealism resulted from fear of scepticism in representative realism [Robinson,H on Berkeley]
23636 Berkeley's idealism gives no grounds for believing in other minds [Reid on Berkeley]
6491 Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought [Berkeley, by Robinson,H]
6720 Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations [Berkeley]
6721 Ideas are perceived by the mind, soul or self [Berkeley]
6723 The 'esse' of objects is 'percipi', and they can only exist in minds [Berkeley]
6722 Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit [Berkeley]
6724 The only substance is spirit, or that which perceives [Berkeley]
6726 No one can, by abstraction, conceive extension and motion of bodies without sensible qualities [Berkeley]
6728 Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion [Berkeley]
6727 Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold [Berkeley]
6729 Material substance is just general existence which can have properties [Berkeley]
6730 We discover natural behaviour by observing settled laws of nature, not necessary connections [Berkeley]
6731 No one can explain how matter affects mind, so matter is redundant in philosophy [Berkeley]
6732 When I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but in another mind [Berkeley]
6733 I cannot imagine time apart from the flow of ideas in my mind [Berkeley]
6714 Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars [Berkeley]
6711 The mind creates abstract ideas by considering qualities separated from their objects [Berkeley]
22309 An idea can only be like another idea [Berkeley]
6734 If properties and qualities arise from an inward essence, we will remain ignorant of nature [Berkeley]
6735 All motion is relative, so a single body cannot move [Berkeley]
6736 I know other minds by ideas which are referred by me to other agents, as their effects [Berkeley]
6737 Particular evils are really good when linked to the whole system of beings [Berkeley]
10581 I can only combine particulars in imagination; I can't create 'abstract' ideas [Berkeley]
15861 The laws of nature are mental regularities which we learn by experience [Berkeley]
6713 If animals have ideas, and are not machines, they must have some reason [Berkeley]
6715 Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars [Berkeley]
6716 Language is presumably for communication, and names stand for ideas [Berkeley]
6717 Abstract ideas are impossible [Berkeley]
6718 I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought [Berkeley]
6719 No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas [Berkeley]
16636 A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents [Berkeley]