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Single Idea 16648
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
]
Full Idea
Accidents are principles of acting and principles of cognizing substance, and are the per se objects of the senses. But it is ridiculous to say that something is a principle of acting (either real or intentional) and yet does not have any formal being.
Gist of Idea
Accidents must have formal being, if they are principles of real action, and of mental action and thought
Source
John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302], IV.12.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 10.5
Book Ref
Pasnau,Robert: 'Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671' [OUP 2011], p.196
A Reaction
Pasnau cites this as the key scholastic argument for accidental properties having some independent and real existence (as required for Transubstantiation). Rival views say accidents are just 'modes' of a thing's existence. Aquinas compromised.
The
24 ideas
from John Duns Scotus
16626
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Substance is only grasped under the general heading of 'being'
[Duns Scotus]
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16660
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Are things distinct if they are both separate, or if only one of them can be separate?
[Duns Scotus, by Pasnau]
|
16776
|
Substance is an intrinsic thing, so parts of substances can't also be intrinsic things
[Duns Scotus]
|
16650
|
'Unity' is a particularly difficult word, because things can have hidden unity
[Duns Scotus]
|
15386
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If only the singular exists, science is impossible, as that relies on true generalities
[Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
|
15387
|
If things were singular they would only differ numerically, but horse and tulip differ more than that
[Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
|
13094
|
The haecceity is the featureless thing which gives ultimate individuality to a substance
[Duns Scotus, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
|
10919
|
What prevents a stone from being divided into parts which are still the stone?
[Duns Scotus]
|
16770
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It is absurd that there is no difference between a genuinely unified thing, and a mere aggregate
[Duns Scotus]
|
16768
|
Two things are different if something is true of one and not of the other
[Duns Scotus]
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16632
|
We distinguish one thing from another by contradiction, because this is, and that is not
[Duns Scotus]
|
16648
|
Accidents must have formal being, if they are principles of real action, and of mental action and thought
[Duns Scotus]
|
16614
|
Matter and form give true unity; subject and accident is just unity 'per accidens'
[Duns Scotus]
|
22128
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Augustine's 'illumination' theory of knowledge leads to nothing but scepticism
[Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
|
22129
|
Certainty comes from the self-evident, from induction, and from self-awareness
[Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
|
22130
|
Scotus defended direct 'intuitive cognition', against the abstractive view
[Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
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22131
|
The will retains its power for opposites, even when it is acting
[Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
|
22123
|
The concept of God is the unique first efficient cause, final cause, and most eminent being
[Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
|
22124
|
We can't infer the infinity of God from creation ex nihilo
[Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
|
22125
|
Duns Scotus was a realist about universals
[Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
|
22121
|
The concept of being has only one meaning, whether talking of universals or of God
[Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
|
22122
|
Being (not sensation or God) is the primary object of the intellect
[Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
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22127
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Scotus said a substantial principle of individuation [haecceitas] was needed for an essence
[Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
|
22126
|
Avicenna and Duns Scotus say essences have independent and prior existence
[Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
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