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Single Idea 16660

[filed under theme 7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence ]

Full Idea

Later standard theories said that a real distinction obtains between two things that can each exist without the other. For Scotus a real distinction requires only that one of the pair be able to exist without the other.

Gist of Idea

Are things distinct if they are both separate, or if only one of them can be separate?

Source

report of John Duns Scotus (In Metaphysics [1304], V.5-6 n91) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.5

Book Ref

Pasnau,Robert: 'Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671' [OUP 2011], p.241

A Reaction

His example is the similarity relation, which is independent of the whiteness on which it is based (since the other thing can become non-white).

The 24 ideas from John Duns Scotus

16626 Substance is only grasped under the general heading of 'being' [Duns Scotus]
16660 Are things distinct if they are both separate, or if only one of them can be separate? [Duns Scotus, by Pasnau]
16776 Substance is an intrinsic thing, so parts of substances can't also be intrinsic things [Duns Scotus]
16650 'Unity' is a particularly difficult word, because things can have hidden unity [Duns Scotus]
13094 The haecceity is the featureless thing which gives ultimate individuality to a substance [Duns Scotus, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
15386 If only the singular exists, science is impossible, as that relies on true generalities [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
15387 If things were singular they would only differ numerically, but horse and tulip differ more than that [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
10919 What prevents a stone from being divided into parts which are still the stone? [Duns Scotus]
16770 It is absurd that there is no difference between a genuinely unified thing, and a mere aggregate [Duns Scotus]
16632 We distinguish one thing from another by contradiction, because this is, and that is not [Duns Scotus]
16768 Two things are different if something is true of one and not of the other [Duns Scotus]
16648 Accidents must have formal being, if they are principles of real action, and of mental action and thought [Duns Scotus]
16614 Matter and form give true unity; subject and accident is just unity 'per accidens' [Duns Scotus]
22125 Duns Scotus was a realist about universals [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
22127 Scotus said a substantial principle of individuation [haecceitas] was needed for an essence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
22128 Augustine's 'illumination' theory of knowledge leads to nothing but scepticism [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
22121 The concept of being has only one meaning, whether talking of universals or of God [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
22122 Being (not sensation or God) is the primary object of the intellect [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
22129 Certainty comes from the self-evident, from induction, and from self-awareness [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
22130 Scotus defended direct 'intuitive cognition', against the abstractive view [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
22131 The will retains its power for opposites, even when it is acting [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
22123 The concept of God is the unique first efficient cause, final cause, and most eminent being [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
22124 We can't infer the infinity of God from creation ex nihilo [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
22126 Avicenna and Duns Scotus say essences have independent and prior existence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]