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Full Idea
The standard scholastic examples of 'entia successiva' are time and motion.
Gist of Idea
Typical successive things are time and motion
Source
Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 18.1)
Book Ref
Pasnau,Robert: 'Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671' [OUP 2011], p.378
A Reaction
Aristotle's examples of a day and the Games seem clearer, as time and motion do not count so clearly as 'things'.
| 16691 | A day, or the games, has one thing after another, actually and potentially occurring [Aristotle] |
| 16696 | Successive things reduce to permanent things [Bonaventura] |
| 16698 | Days exist, and yet they seem to be made up of parts which don't exist [Burley] |
| 16690 | Unlike permanent things, successive things cannot exist all at once [Burley] |
| 16695 | Successive entities are in flux, flowing in existence, with different parts at different times [Oresme] |
| 16703 | God could make a successive thing so that previous parts cease to exist [Albert of Saxony] |
| 16699 | Successive entities just need parts to succeed one another, without their existence [Albert of Saxony] |
| 16700 | In order to speak about time and successive entities, the 'present' must be enlarged [Wycliff] |
| 16701 | To be successive a thing needs parts, which must therefore be lodged outside that instant [Wycliff] |
| 16694 | Typical successive things are time and motion [Pasnau] |