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Full Idea
Everything successive reduces to something permanent.
Gist of Idea
Successive things reduce to permanent things
Source
Bonaventura (Commentary on Sentences [1252], II.2.1.1.3 ad 5), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.2
Book Ref
Pasnau,Robert: 'Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671' [OUP 2011], p.380
A Reaction
Avicenna first took successive entities seriously, but Bonaventure and Aquinas seem to have rejected them, or given reductive accounts of them. It resembles modern actualists versus modal realists.
| 16691 | A day, or the games, has one thing after another, actually and potentially occurring [Aristotle] |
| 16696 | Successive things reduce to permanent things [Bonaventura] |
| 16698 | Days exist, and yet they seem to be made up of parts which don't exist [Burley] |
| 16690 | Unlike permanent things, successive things cannot exist all at once [Burley] |
| 16695 | Successive entities are in flux, flowing in existence, with different parts at different times [Oresme] |
| 16703 | God could make a successive thing so that previous parts cease to exist [Albert of Saxony] |
| 16699 | Successive entities just need parts to succeed one another, without their existence [Albert of Saxony] |
| 16700 | In order to speak about time and successive entities, the 'present' must be enlarged [Wycliff] |
| 16701 | To be successive a thing needs parts, which must therefore be lodged outside that instant [Wycliff] |
| 16694 | Typical successive things are time and motion [Pasnau] |