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Single Idea 16735

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions ]

Full Idea

In Locke and Boyle, 'disposition' and its various cognates are standardly used to refer to the corpuscular structure of a body - the spatial arrangement of its parts - without reflecting any commitment to a dispositional property.

Gist of Idea

In the 17th century, 'disposition' usually just means the spatial arrangement of parts

Source

report of Robert Boyle (The Origin of Forms and Qualities [1666]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.2

Book Ref

Pasnau,Robert: 'Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671' [OUP 2011], p.521


A Reaction

Here as a warning against enthusiasts for dispositional properties misreadigmg 17th century texts to their supposed advantage. Pasnau says none of them believe in dispositional properties or real powers.


The 25 ideas with the same theme [idea of a disposition towards certain behaviour]:

In the 17th century, 'disposition' usually just means the spatial arrangement of parts [Boyle, by Pasnau]
Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman]
Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine]
Either dispositions rest on structures, or we keep saying 'all things being equal' [Quine]
Dispositions in action can be destroyed, be recovered, or remain unchanged [Martin,CB]
To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong]
Nearly all fundamental properties of physics are dispositional [Ellis]
The most fundamental properties of nature (mass, charge, spin ...) all seem to be dispositions [Ellis]
Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker]
We can bring dispositions into existence, as in creating an identifier [Dennett, by Mumford]
Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world [Molnar]
Are a property's dispositions built in, or contingently added? [Heil]
Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons [Mumford]
Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties [Mumford]
Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role [Mumford]
Dispositionality is a natural selection function, picking outcomes from the range of possibilities [Mumford/Anjum]
Instead of adding Aristotelian forms to physical stuff, one could add dispositions [Pasnau]
I have an 'iterated ability' to learn the violin - that is, the ability to acquire that ability [Vetter]
Dispositions have directed behaviour which occurs if triggered [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
'Masked' dispositions fail to react because something intervenes [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
A disposition is 'altered' when the stimulus reverses the disposition [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
A disposition is 'mimicked' if a different cause produces that effect from that stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
A 'trick' can look like a stimulus for a disposition which will happen without it [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
Some dispositions manifest themselves without a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
We could analyse dispositions as 'possibilities', with no mention of a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]