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Single Idea 16742

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences ]

Full Idea

We can almost never set out the essences of things, as they are in things. Instead, we work through their connection to some non-essential feature, and we seem to succeed well enough when we spell it out through the feature closest to the essence.

Gist of Idea

We only know essences through non-essential features, esp. those closest to the essence

Source

Francisco Suárez (Disputationes metaphysicae [1597], 40.4.16), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.5

Book Ref

Pasnau,Robert: 'Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671' [OUP 2011], p.539


A Reaction

It is a common view that with geometrical figures we can actually experience the essence itself. So has science broken through, and discerned actual essences of things?


The 18 ideas from Francisco Suárez

Substances are incomplete unless they have modes [Suárez, by Pasnau]
Forms must rule over faculties and accidents, and are the source of action and unity [Suárez]
Partial forms of leaf and fruit are united in the whole form of the tree [Suárez]
The best support for substantial forms is the co-ordinated unity of a natural being [Suárez]
Other things could occupy the same location as an angel [Suárez]
We can get at the essential nature of 'quantity' by knowing bulk and extension [Suárez]
We only know essences through non-essential features, esp. those closest to the essence [Suárez]
There are entities, and then positive 'modes', modifying aspects outside the thing's essence [Suárez]
A mode determines the state and character of a quantity, without adding to it [Suárez]
Identity does not exclude possible or imagined difference [Suárez, by Boulter]
Real Essential distinction: A and B are of different natural kinds [Suárez, by Boulter]
Minor Real distinction: B needs A, but A doesn't need B [Suárez, by Boulter]
Major Real distinction: A and B have independent existences [Suárez, by Boulter]
Conceptual/Mental distinction: one thing can be conceived of in two different ways [Suárez, by Boulter]
Modal distinction: A isn't B or its property, but still needs B [Suárez, by Boulter]
Scholastics assess possibility by what has actually happened in reality [Suárez, by Boulter]
The old 'influx' view of causation says it is a flow of accidental properties from A to B [Suárez, by Jolley]
Only natural kinds and their members have real essences [Suárez, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]