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Single Idea 16744

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived ]

Full Idea

There are no powers in stones and plants that are not so mysterious that they cannot be explained …from principles that are known to all and admitted by all, namely the shape, size, position, and motion of particles of matter.

Gist of Idea

All powers can be explained by obvious features like size, shape and motion of matter

Source

René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], IV.187), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.6

Book Ref

Pasnau,Robert: 'Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671' [OUP 2011], p.540


A Reaction

This is an invocation of 'categorical' properties, against dispositions. I take this to be quite wrong. The explanation goes the other way. What supports the structures; what drives the motion; what initiates anything?


The 23 ideas with the same theme [powers as products of something more basic]:

A power is not a cause, but an aptitude for a cause [Zabarella]
All powers can be explained by obvious features like size, shape and motion of matter [Descartes]
The complete power of an event is just the aggregate of the qualities that produced it [Hobbes]
The essence of whiteness in a man is nothing but the power to produce the idea of whiteness [Locke]
It is obvious that there could not be a power without a subject which possesses it [Reid]
Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine]
Basic powers may not be explained by structure, if at the bottom level there is no structure [Ellis]
Maybe dispositions can be explained by intrinsic properties or structures [Ellis]
I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker]
Things have powers in virtue of (which are entailed by) their properties [Shoemaker]
One power can come from different properties; a thing's powers come from its properties [Shoemaker]
Properties are functions producing powers, and powers are functions producing effects [Shoemaker]
Powers are not qualities; they just point to directions of empirical investigation [Harré/Madden]
A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis]
All dispositions must have causal bases [Lewis]
Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties [Lewis, by Hawthorne]
Powers or dispositions are usually seen as caused by lower-level qualities [Heil]
Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role [Mumford]
If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate [Mumford]
I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation [Mumford]
If all properties are potencies, and stimuli and manifestation characterise them, there is a regress [Bird]
The essence of a potency involves relations, e.g. mass, to impressed force and acceleration [Bird]
Powers are not just basic forces, since they combine to make new powers [Mumford/Anjum]