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Single Idea 16752

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence ]

Full Idea

If the eye were an animal, sight would have been its soul, for sight is the substance or essence of the eye which corresponds to the formula, the eye being merely the matter of seeing; when seeing is removed it is no longer an eye,except in name.

Gist of Idea

Sight is the essence of the eye, fitting its definition; the eye itself is just the matter

Source

Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 412b18)

Book Ref

Aristotle: 'The Basic Works of Aristotle', ed/tr. McKeon,Richard [Modern Library Classics 2001], p.556

A Reaction

This is a drastic view of form as merely function, which occasionally appears in Aristotle. To say a blind eye is not an eye is a tricky move in metaphysics. So what is it? In some sense it is still an eye.

Related Idea

Idea 16753 Giving the function of a house defines its actuality [Aristotle]

The 24 ideas with the same theme [powers as giving the essential nature of each thing]:

15658 The hidden harmony is stronger than the visible [Heraclitus]
16752 Sight is the essence of the eye, fitting its definition; the eye itself is just the matter [Aristotle]
16753 Giving the function of a house defines its actuality [Aristotle]
17206 The essence of a thing is its effort to persevere [Spinoza]
15976 What is the texture - the real essence - which makes substances behave in distinct ways? [Locke]
12750 The question is whether force is self-sufficient in bodies, and essential, or dependent on something [Lenfant]
12714 The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting [Leibniz]
5056 Material or immaterial substances cannot be conceived without their essential activity [Leibniz]
13168 My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz]
13169 I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz]
12722 Thought terminates in force, rather than extension [Leibniz]
12778 There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite [Leibniz]
12783 Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality [Leibniz]
13095 Essence is primitive force, or a law of change [Leibniz]
12713 Forms have sensation and appetite, the latter being the ability to act on other bodies [Leibniz, by Garber]
13087 The essence of a thing is its real possibilities [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
12050 Substances contain a source of change or principle of activity [Wiggins]
16755 The possible Aristotelian view that forms are real and active principles is clearly wrong [Fine,K, by Pasnau]
21350 If properties are powers, then causal relations are internal relations [Heil]
12256 We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers [Oderberg]
16767 There is no centralised power, but we still need essence for a metaphysical understanding [Pasnau]
17954 Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter]
23711 A power is a property which consists entirely of dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
23712 Powers are qualitative properties which fully ground dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]