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Single Idea 16755

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence ]

Full Idea

Aristotle seems to have a possible basis for the belief [in individual forms], namely that forms are real and active principles in the world, which is denied by any right-minded modern.

Gist of Idea

The possible Aristotelian view that forms are real and active principles is clearly wrong

Source

report of Kit Fine (A Puzzle Concerning Matter and Form [1994], p.19) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.3 n8

Book Ref

Pasnau,Robert: 'Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671' [OUP 2011], p.560


A Reaction

Pasnau says this is the view of forms promoted by the scholastics, whereas Aristotle's own view should be understood as 'metaphysical'.


The 24 ideas with the same theme [powers as giving the essential nature of each thing]:

The hidden harmony is stronger than the visible [Heraclitus]
Sight is the essence of the eye, fitting its definition; the eye itself is just the matter [Aristotle]
Giving the function of a house defines its actuality [Aristotle]
The essence of a thing is its effort to persevere [Spinoza]
What is the texture - the real essence - which makes substances behave in distinct ways? [Locke]
The question is whether force is self-sufficient in bodies, and essential, or dependent on something [Lenfant]
The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting [Leibniz]
Material or immaterial substances cannot be conceived without their essential activity [Leibniz]
My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz]
I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz]
Thought terminates in force, rather than extension [Leibniz]
There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite [Leibniz]
Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality [Leibniz]
Essence is primitive force, or a law of change [Leibniz]
Forms have sensation and appetite, the latter being the ability to act on other bodies [Leibniz, by Garber]
The essence of a thing is its real possibilities [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
Substances contain a source of change or principle of activity [Wiggins]
The possible Aristotelian view that forms are real and active principles is clearly wrong [Fine,K, by Pasnau]
If properties are powers, then causal relations are internal relations [Heil]
We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers [Oderberg]
There is no centralised power, but we still need essence for a metaphysical understanding [Pasnau]
Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter]
A power is a property which consists entirely of dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
Powers are qualitative properties which fully ground dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]