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Single Idea 16775
[filed under theme 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
]
Full Idea
According to strict corpuscularianism the only real constituents of a substance are its integral parts.
Gist of Idea
For corpuscularians, a substance is just its integral parts
Source
Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 26.1)
Book Ref
Pasnau,Robert: 'Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671' [OUP 2011], p.606
A Reaction
An understandable reaction to the emptiness of Aristotelian substantial forms in science. It seems to leave out the structural principles that distinguish one arrangement of parts from another. See Koslicki on this.
Related Idea
Idea 16776
Substance is an intrinsic thing, so parts of substances can't also be intrinsic things [Duns Scotus]
The
20 ideas
with the same theme
[objections to the very concept of substances]:
3628
|
Substance cannot be conceived or explained to others
[Gassendi on Descartes]
|
16774
|
Descartes thinks distinguishing substances from aggregates is pointless
[Descartes, by Pasnau]
|
12485
|
We don't know what substance is, and only vaguely know what it does
[Locke]
|
7931
|
If a substance is just a thing that has properties, it seems to be a characterless non-entity
[Leibniz, by Macdonald,C]
|
16636
|
A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents
[Berkeley]
|
12048
|
The only meaning we have for substance is a collection of qualities
[Hume]
|
13424
|
Aristotelians propose accidents supported by substance, but they don't understand either of them
[Hume]
|
11833
|
The substance, once the predicates are removed, remains unknown to us
[Kant]
|
18981
|
'Substance' is just a word for groupings and structures in experience
[James]
|
14733
|
An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science
[Russell]
|
6465
|
We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it
[Russell]
|
6471
|
The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate
[Russell]
|
15304
|
We can escape substance and its properties, if we take fields of pure powers as ultimate
[Harré/Madden]
|
7046
|
Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties
[Heil]
|
12252
|
Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle
[Oderberg]
|
7932
|
A phenomenalist cannot distinguish substance from attribute, so must accept the bundle view
[Macdonald,C]
|
7937
|
When we ascribe a property to a substance, the bundle theory will make that a tautology
[Macdonald,C]
|
7939
|
Substances persist through change, but the bundle theory says they can't
[Macdonald,C]
|
7940
|
A substance might be a sequence of bundles, rather than a single bundle
[Macdonald,C]
|
16775
|
For corpuscularians, a substance is just its integral parts
[Pasnau]
|