more from this thinker
|
more from this text
Single Idea 16795
[filed under theme 9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
]
Full Idea
It is one thing to be the same substance, another the same man, and a third the same person, if Person, Man and Substance are three names standing for three different ideas; for such as is the idea belonging to the name, such must be the identity.
Gist of Idea
Same person, man or substance are different identities, belonging to different ideas
Source
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.27.07)
Book Ref
Locke,John: 'Essay Concerning Human Understanding', ed/tr. Nidditch,P.H. [OUP 1979], p.332
A Reaction
It might be better to say that two things can only be 'the same' in some respect. You can say 'in some respects they are the same', without citing the respects.
The
18 ideas
with the same theme
[identity can only ever be in respect of some feature]:
|
16794
|
As an infant, Socrates was not the same body, but he was the same human being
[Hobbes]
|
|
16795
|
Same person, man or substance are different identities, belonging to different ideas
[Locke]
|
|
12153
|
Geach denies Frege's view, that 'being the same F' splits into being the same and being F
[Perry on Frege]
|
|
17653
|
Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness
[Goodman]
|
|
16075
|
Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory
[Wasserman on Geach]
|
|
12152
|
Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as'
[Geach]
|
|
17512
|
If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too?
[Ayers]
|
|
13953
|
An act of ostension doesn't seem to need a 'sort' of thing, even of a very broad kind
[Cartwright,R]
|
|
12155
|
Statements of 'relative identity' are really statements of resemblance
[Perry]
|
|
14362
|
Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals
[Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
|
|
11838
|
Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category
[Wiggins]
|
|
11847
|
To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them
[Wiggins]
|
|
14755
|
Gallois is committed to identity with respect to times, and denial of simple identity
[Gallois, by Sider]
|
|
8305
|
A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it
[Lowe]
|
|
10321
|
We sometimes apply identity without having a real criterion
[Hale]
|
|
15185
|
We aren't clear about 'same stuff as this', so a principle of individuation is needed to identify it
[Sidelle]
|
|
4640
|
If identity is based on 'true of X' instead of 'property of X' we get the Masked Man fallacy ('I know X but not Y')
[Baggini /Fosl, by PG]
|
|
16074
|
Relative identity may reject transitivity, but that suggests that it isn't about 'identity'
[Wasserman]
|