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Single Idea 16802
[filed under theme 14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
]
Full Idea
Old evidence seems to provide some confirmation, but Bayesianism does not allow for this, since old evidence will have a prior probability of one, and so have no effect on the posterior probability of the hypothesis.
Gist of Idea
Bayes seems to rule out prior evidence, since that has a probability of one
Source
Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 01 'Descr')
Book Ref
Lipton,Peter: 'Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd ed)' [Routledge 2004], p.17
The
19 ideas
with the same theme
[equation showing probability of an inductive truth]:
14280
|
The probability of two events is the first probability times the second probability assuming the first
[Bayes]
|
22656
|
Trying to assess probabilities by mere calculation is absurd and impossible
[James]
|
19143
|
Ramsey gave axioms for an uncertain agent to decide their preferences
[Ramsey, by Davidson]
|
19155
|
Instead of gambling, Jeffrey made the objects of Bayesian preference to be propositions
[Jeffrey, by Davidson]
|
2751
|
Probabilities can only be assessed relative to some evidence
[Dancy,J]
|
2798
|
Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E)
[Horwich]
|
2799
|
Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence
[Horwich]
|
16803
|
Bayes is too liberal, since any logical consequence of a hypothesis confirms it
[Lipton]
|
16802
|
Bayes seems to rule out prior evidence, since that has a probability of one
[Lipton]
|
16801
|
A hypothesis is confirmed if an unlikely prediction comes true
[Lipton]
|
16839
|
Explanation may be an important part of implementing Bayes's Theorem
[Lipton]
|
16837
|
Bayes involves 'prior' probabilities, 'likelihood', 'posterior' probability, and 'conditionalising'
[Lipton]
|
6372
|
Since every tautology has a probability of 1, should we believe all tautologies?
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
17600
|
Bayesian inference is forced to rely on approximations
[Thagard]
|
14990
|
Bayes produces weird results if the prior probabilities are bizarre
[Sider]
|
6798
|
Bayesianism claims to find rationality and truth in induction, and show how science works
[Bird]
|
22178
|
If the rules only concern changes of belief, and not the starting point, absurd views can look ratiional
[Okasha]
|
17943
|
Probability supports Bayesianism better as degrees of belief than as ratios of frequencies
[Colyvan]
|
22365
|
The Bayesian approach is explicitly subjective about probabilities
[Reiss/Sprenger]
|