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Single Idea 16825

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence ]

Full Idea

How can Best Explanation distinguish negative evidence from irrelevant evidence, when the evidence is logically consistent with the hypothesis?

Gist of Idea

How do we distinguish negative from irrelevant evidence, if both match the hypothesis?

Source

Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 05 'A case')

Book Ref

Lipton,Peter: 'Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd ed)' [Routledge 2004], p.76

A Reaction

There seems no answer to this other than to assess batches of evidence by their coherence, rather than one at a time. Anomalies can be conclusive, or pure chance.

The 17 ideas with the same theme [experiences and facts pointing towards knowledge]:

23641 People dislike believing without evidence, and try to avoid it [Reid]
19224 Scientists will give up any conclusion, if experience opposes it [Peirce]
17073 I simply reject evidence, if it is totally contrary to my web of belief [Smart]
3097 We don't distinguish between accepting, and accepting as evidence [Harman]
7450 In the medieval view, only deduction counted as true evidence [Hacking]
7451 Formerly evidence came from people; the new idea was that things provided evidence [Hacking]
16825 How do we distinguish negative from irrelevant evidence, if both match the hypothesis? [Lipton]
19687 Absence of evidence proves nothing, and weird claims need special evidence [McGrew]
19684 Does spotting a new possibility count as evidence? [McGrew]
19688 Every event is highly unlikely (in detail), but may be perfectly plausible [McGrew]
19686 Criminal law needs two separate witnesses, but historians will accept one witness [McGrew]
19680 Maybe all evidence consists of beliefs, rather than of facts [McGrew]
19681 If all evidence is propositional, what is the evidence for the proposition? Do we face a regress? [McGrew]
19689 Several unreliable witnesses can give good support, if they all say the same thing [McGrew]
17771 How we evaluate evidence depends on our background beliefs [Bayne]
17770 Clifford's dictum seems to block our beliefs in morality, politics and philosophy [Bayne]
18820 In English 'evidence' is a mass term, qualified by 'little' and 'more' [Rumfitt]