more on this theme
|
more from this thinker
Single Idea 16831
[filed under theme 14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
]
Full Idea
Explanatory considerations help with the raven paradox since, while the raven hypothesis may provide an explanation for the blackness of a particular raven, neither the original hypothesis nor its contrastive explanation explain why the shoe is white.
Gist of Idea
A theory may explain the blackness of a raven, but say nothing about the whiteness of shoes
Source
Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 06 'Unsuitable')
Book Ref
Lipton,Peter: 'Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd ed)' [Routledge 2004], p.92
A Reaction
For me, the examination of ravens is a search for the essence of ravenhood, which is why non-ravens don't help. Of course, if you eliminate all culprits except one, you have your culprit, but will your evidence stand up in court?
The
56 ideas
from 'Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd)'
16803
|
Bayes is too liberal, since any logical consequence of a hypothesis confirms it
[Lipton]
|
16802
|
Bayes seems to rule out prior evidence, since that has a probability of one
[Lipton]
|
16804
|
Induction is repetition, instances, deduction, probability or causation
[Lipton]
|
16801
|
A hypothesis is confirmed if an unlikely prediction comes true
[Lipton]
|
16800
|
An inductive inference is underdetermined, by definition
[Lipton]
|
16799
|
Inductive inference is not proof, but weighing evidence and probability
[Lipton]
|
16809
|
Good explanations may involve no laws and no deductions
[Lipton]
|
16807
|
An explanation gives the reason the phenomenon occurred
[Lipton]
|
16808
|
An explanation is what makes the unfamiliar familiar to us
[Lipton]
|
16811
|
An explanation unifies a phenomenon with our account of other phenomena
[Lipton]
|
16810
|
Deduction explanation is too easy; any law at all will imply the facts - together with the facts!
[Lipton]
|
16812
|
An explanation shows why it was necessary that the effect occurred
[Lipton]
|
16806
|
An explanation is what is added to knowledge to yield understanding
[Lipton]
|
16816
|
In 'contrastive' explanation there is a fact and a foil - why that fact, rather than this foil?
[Lipton]
|
16814
|
Understanding is not mysterious - it is just more knowledge, of causes
[Lipton]
|
16813
|
To explain is to give either the causal history, or the causal mechanism
[Lipton]
|
16815
|
Mathematical and philosophical explanations are not causal
[Lipton]
|
16824
|
Is Inference to the Best Explanation nothing more than inferring the likeliest cause?
[Lipton]
|
16822
|
Seaching for explanations is a good way to discover the structure of the world
[Lipton]
|
16823
|
Standard induction does not allow for vertical inferences, to some unobservable lower level
[Lipton]
|
16817
|
Best Explanation as a guide to inference is preferable to best standard explanations
[Lipton]
|
16818
|
The 'likeliest' explanation is the best supported; the 'loveliest' gives the most understanding
[Lipton]
|
16819
|
IBE is inferring that the best potential explanation is the actual explanation
[Lipton]
|
16820
|
Finding the 'loveliest' potential explanation links truth to understanding
[Lipton]
|
16821
|
Must we only have one explanation, and must all the data be made relevant?
[Lipton]
|
16826
|
With too many causes, find a suitable 'foil' for contrast, and the field narrows right down
[Lipton]
|
16825
|
How do we distinguish negative from irrelevant evidence, if both match the hypothesis?
[Lipton]
|
16827
|
If we make a hypothesis about data, then a deduction, where does the hypothesis come from?
[Lipton]
|
16829
|
We reject deductive explanations if they don't explain, not if the deduction is bad
[Lipton]
|
16828
|
IBE is not passive treatment of data, but involves feedback between theory and data search
[Lipton]
|
16832
|
If something in ravens makes them black, it may be essential (definitive of ravens)
[Lipton]
|
16836
|
My shoes are not white because they lack some black essence of ravens
[Lipton]
|
16831
|
A theory may explain the blackness of a raven, but say nothing about the whiteness of shoes
[Lipton]
|
16833
|
We can't turn non-black non-ravens into ravens, to test the theory
[Lipton]
|
16834
|
To pick a suitable contrast to ravens, we need a hypothesis about their genes
[Lipton]
|
16840
|
To maximise probability, don't go beyond your data
[Lipton]
|
16838
|
Bayesians say best explanations build up an incoherent overall position
[Lipton]
|
16837
|
Bayes involves 'prior' probabilities, 'likelihood', 'posterior' probability, and 'conditionalising'
[Lipton]
|
16839
|
Explanation may be an important part of implementing Bayes's Theorem
[Lipton]
|
16848
|
Causal inferences are clearest when we can manipulate things
[Lipton]
|
16846
|
A cause may not be an explanation
[Lipton]
|
16847
|
Counterfactual causation makes causes necessary but not sufficient
[Lipton]
|
16849
|
Explanations may be easier to find than causes
[Lipton]
|
16844
|
A contrasting difference is the cause if it offers the best explanation
[Lipton]
|
16842
|
We want to know not just the cause, but how the cause operated
[Lipton]
|
16841
|
Good inference has mechanism, precision, scope, simplicity, fertility and background fit
[Lipton]
|
16854
|
Contrary pairs entail contradictions; one member entails negation of the other
[Lipton]
|
16855
|
The best theory is boring: compare 'all planets move elliptically' with 'most of them do'
[Lipton]
|
16853
|
We select possible explanations for explanatory reasons, as well as choosing among them
[Lipton]
|
16852
|
Best explanation can't be a guide to truth, because the truth must precede explanation
[Lipton]
|
16851
|
The inference to observables and unobservables is almost the same, so why distinguish them?
[Lipton]
|
16850
|
Explanation may describe induction, but may not show how it justifies, or leads to truth
[Lipton]
|
16856
|
It is more impressive that relativity predicted Mercury's orbit than if it had accommodated it
[Lipton]
|
16857
|
Predictions are best for finding explanations, because mere accommodations can be fudged
[Lipton]
|
16858
|
We can argue to support our beliefs, so induction will support induction, for believers in induction
[Lipton]
|
16798
|
We infer from evidence by working out what would explain that evidence
[Lipton]
|