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Single Idea 16833
[filed under theme 14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
]
Full Idea
We cannot transform a non-black non-raven into a raven to see whether we get a simultaneous transformation from non-black to black, in the way we can transform a flame without sodium into a flame with sodium.
Clarification
Sodium flames burn yellow
Gist of Idea
We can't turn non-black non-ravens into ravens, to test the theory
Source
Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 06 'Unsuitable')
Book Ref
Lipton,Peter: 'Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd ed)' [Routledge 2004], p.98
A Reaction
A white shoe would be an example of a non-black non-raven. People mesmerised by the raven paradox are too concerned with investigation being a 'logical' process. Lipton makes a nice point. We need to know the nature of ravens.
The
56 ideas
from Peter Lipton
16803
|
Bayes is too liberal, since any logical consequence of a hypothesis confirms it
[Lipton]
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16802
|
Bayes seems to rule out prior evidence, since that has a probability of one
[Lipton]
|
16804
|
Induction is repetition, instances, deduction, probability or causation
[Lipton]
|
16801
|
A hypothesis is confirmed if an unlikely prediction comes true
[Lipton]
|
16800
|
An inductive inference is underdetermined, by definition
[Lipton]
|
16799
|
Inductive inference is not proof, but weighing evidence and probability
[Lipton]
|
16809
|
Good explanations may involve no laws and no deductions
[Lipton]
|
16807
|
An explanation gives the reason the phenomenon occurred
[Lipton]
|
16808
|
An explanation is what makes the unfamiliar familiar to us
[Lipton]
|
16811
|
An explanation unifies a phenomenon with our account of other phenomena
[Lipton]
|
16810
|
Deduction explanation is too easy; any law at all will imply the facts - together with the facts!
[Lipton]
|
16812
|
An explanation shows why it was necessary that the effect occurred
[Lipton]
|
16806
|
An explanation is what is added to knowledge to yield understanding
[Lipton]
|
16816
|
In 'contrastive' explanation there is a fact and a foil - why that fact, rather than this foil?
[Lipton]
|
16814
|
Understanding is not mysterious - it is just more knowledge, of causes
[Lipton]
|
16813
|
To explain is to give either the causal history, or the causal mechanism
[Lipton]
|
16815
|
Mathematical and philosophical explanations are not causal
[Lipton]
|
16824
|
Is Inference to the Best Explanation nothing more than inferring the likeliest cause?
[Lipton]
|
16822
|
Seaching for explanations is a good way to discover the structure of the world
[Lipton]
|
16823
|
Standard induction does not allow for vertical inferences, to some unobservable lower level
[Lipton]
|
16817
|
Best Explanation as a guide to inference is preferable to best standard explanations
[Lipton]
|
16818
|
The 'likeliest' explanation is the best supported; the 'loveliest' gives the most understanding
[Lipton]
|
16819
|
IBE is inferring that the best potential explanation is the actual explanation
[Lipton]
|
16820
|
Finding the 'loveliest' potential explanation links truth to understanding
[Lipton]
|
16821
|
Must we only have one explanation, and must all the data be made relevant?
[Lipton]
|
16826
|
With too many causes, find a suitable 'foil' for contrast, and the field narrows right down
[Lipton]
|
16825
|
How do we distinguish negative from irrelevant evidence, if both match the hypothesis?
[Lipton]
|
16827
|
If we make a hypothesis about data, then a deduction, where does the hypothesis come from?
[Lipton]
|
16829
|
We reject deductive explanations if they don't explain, not if the deduction is bad
[Lipton]
|
16828
|
IBE is not passive treatment of data, but involves feedback between theory and data search
[Lipton]
|
16832
|
If something in ravens makes them black, it may be essential (definitive of ravens)
[Lipton]
|
16836
|
My shoes are not white because they lack some black essence of ravens
[Lipton]
|
16831
|
A theory may explain the blackness of a raven, but say nothing about the whiteness of shoes
[Lipton]
|
16833
|
We can't turn non-black non-ravens into ravens, to test the theory
[Lipton]
|
16834
|
To pick a suitable contrast to ravens, we need a hypothesis about their genes
[Lipton]
|
16840
|
To maximise probability, don't go beyond your data
[Lipton]
|
16838
|
Bayesians say best explanations build up an incoherent overall position
[Lipton]
|
16837
|
Bayes involves 'prior' probabilities, 'likelihood', 'posterior' probability, and 'conditionalising'
[Lipton]
|
16839
|
Explanation may be an important part of implementing Bayes's Theorem
[Lipton]
|
16848
|
Causal inferences are clearest when we can manipulate things
[Lipton]
|
16846
|
A cause may not be an explanation
[Lipton]
|
16847
|
Counterfactual causation makes causes necessary but not sufficient
[Lipton]
|
16849
|
Explanations may be easier to find than causes
[Lipton]
|
16844
|
A contrasting difference is the cause if it offers the best explanation
[Lipton]
|
16842
|
We want to know not just the cause, but how the cause operated
[Lipton]
|
16841
|
Good inference has mechanism, precision, scope, simplicity, fertility and background fit
[Lipton]
|
16854
|
Contrary pairs entail contradictions; one member entails negation of the other
[Lipton]
|
16855
|
The best theory is boring: compare 'all planets move elliptically' with 'most of them do'
[Lipton]
|
16853
|
We select possible explanations for explanatory reasons, as well as choosing among them
[Lipton]
|
16852
|
Best explanation can't be a guide to truth, because the truth must precede explanation
[Lipton]
|
16851
|
The inference to observables and unobservables is almost the same, so why distinguish them?
[Lipton]
|
16850
|
Explanation may describe induction, but may not show how it justifies, or leads to truth
[Lipton]
|
16856
|
It is more impressive that relativity predicted Mercury's orbit than if it had accommodated it
[Lipton]
|
16857
|
Predictions are best for finding explanations, because mere accommodations can be fudged
[Lipton]
|
16858
|
We can argue to support our beliefs, so induction will support induction, for believers in induction
[Lipton]
|
16798
|
We infer from evidence by working out what would explain that evidence
[Lipton]
|