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Full Idea
The inferential path to unobservables is often the same as to unobserved observables. In these two sorts of case, the reason for belief can be equally strong, so the suggestion that we infer truth in one case but not the other seems perverse.
Gist of Idea
The inference to observables and unobservables is almost the same, so why distinguish them?
Source
Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 09 'Voltaire's')
Book Ref
Lipton,Peter: 'Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd ed)' [Routledge 2004], p.146
A Reaction
[Van Fraassen 1980 is the target of this] Van F seems to be in the grip of some sort of verificationism, which I always disliked on the grounds that speculation can be highly meaningful. Why embrace something because it 'could' be observed?
| 6026 | How can you investigate without some preconception of your object? [Sext.Empiricus] |
| 12109 | We must observe in order to form theories, but connected observations need prior theories [Comte] |
| 22655 | Scientific genius extracts more than other people from the same evidence [James] |
| 15880 | In physical sciences particular observations are ordered, but in biology only the classes are ordered [Harré] |
| 3858 | A full understanding of 'yellow' involves some theory [Newton-Smith] |
| 3587 | Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory [Williams,M] |
| 16851 | The inference to observables and unobservables is almost the same, so why distinguish them? [Lipton] |
| 6792 | If theories need observation, and observations need theories, how do we start? [Bird] |