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Single Idea 16867

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic ]

Full Idea

A proof does not only serve to convince us of the truth of what is proved: it also serves to reveal logical relations between truths. Hence we find in Euclid proofs of truths that appear to stand in no need of proof because they are obvious without one.

Gist of Idea

Logic not only proves things, but also reveals logical relations between them

Source

Gottlob Frege (Logic in Mathematics [1914], p.204)

Book Ref

Frege,Gottlob: 'Posthumous Writings', ed/tr. Hermes/Long/White etc [Blackwell 1979], p.204


A Reaction

This is a key idea in Frege's philosophy, and a reason why he is the founder of modern analytic philosophy, with logic placed at the centre of the subject. I take the value of proofs to be raising questions, more than giving answers.


The 20 ideas from 'Logic in Mathematics'

Frege suggested that mathematics should only accept stipulative definitions [Frege, by Gupta]
If principles are provable, they are theorems; if not, they are axioms [Frege]
Does some mathematical reasoning (such as mathematical induction) not belong to logic? [Frege]
The closest subject to logic is mathematics, which does little apart from drawing inferences [Frege]
'Theorems' are both proved, and used in proofs [Frege]
Tracing inference backwards closes in on a small set of axioms and postulates [Frege]
Logic not only proves things, but also reveals logical relations between them [Frege]
The essence of mathematics is the kernel of primitive truths on which it rests [Frege]
A truth can be an axiom in one system and not in another [Frege]
Axioms are truths which cannot be doubted, and for which no proof is needed [Frege]
To create order in mathematics we need a full system, guided by patterns of inference [Frege]
Thoughts are not subjective or psychological, because some thoughts are the same for us all [Frege]
A thought is the sense expressed by a sentence, and is what we prove [Frege]
The parts of a thought map onto the parts of a sentence [Frege]
We need definitions to cram retrievable sense into a signed receptacle [Frege]
We use signs to mark receptacles for complex senses [Frege]
A 'constructive' (as opposed to 'analytic') definition creates a new sign [Frege]
We must be clear about every premise and every law used in a proof [Frege]
A sign won't gain sense just from being used in sentences with familiar components [Frege]
Every concept must have a sharp boundary; we cannot allow an indeterminate third case [Frege]