more on this theme     |     more from this thinker

Single Idea 16874

[filed under theme 19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions ]

Full Idea

A sentence is generally a complex sign, so the thought expressed by it is complex too: in fact it is put together in such a way that parts of a thought correspond to parts of the sentence.

Gist of Idea

The parts of a thought map onto the parts of a sentence

Source

Gottlob Frege (Logic in Mathematics [1914], p.207)

Book Ref

Frege,Gottlob: 'Posthumous Writings', ed/tr. Hermes/Long/White etc [Blackwell 1979], p.207

A Reaction

This is the compositional view of propositions, as opposed to the holistic view.

The 20 ideas from 'Logic in Mathematics'

11219 Frege suggested that mathematics should only accept stipulative definitions [Frege, by Gupta]
16864 If principles are provable, they are theorems; if not, they are axioms [Frege]
16863 Does some mathematical reasoning (such as mathematical induction) not belong to logic? [Frege]
16862 The closest subject to logic is mathematics, which does little apart from drawing inferences [Frege]
16865 'Theorems' are both proved, and used in proofs [Frege]
16866 Tracing inference backwards closes in on a small set of axioms and postulates [Frege]
16867 Logic not only proves things, but also reveals logical relations between them [Frege]
16868 The essence of mathematics is the kernel of primitive truths on which it rests [Frege]
16871 A truth can be an axiom in one system and not in another [Frege]
16870 Axioms are truths which cannot be doubted, and for which no proof is needed [Frege]
16869 To create order in mathematics we need a full system, guided by patterns of inference [Frege]
16873 Thoughts are not subjective or psychological, because some thoughts are the same for us all [Frege]
16872 A thought is the sense expressed by a sentence, and is what we prove [Frege]
16874 The parts of a thought map onto the parts of a sentence [Frege]
16876 We need definitions to cram retrievable sense into a signed receptacle [Frege]
16875 We use signs to mark receptacles for complex senses [Frege]
16877 A 'constructive' (as opposed to 'analytic') definition creates a new sign [Frege]
16878 We must be clear about every premise and every law used in a proof [Frege]
16879 A sign won't gain sense just from being used in sentences with familiar components [Frege]
9388 Every concept must have a sharp boundary; we cannot allow an indeterminate third case [Frege]