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Single Idea 16887

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence ]

Full Idea

Frege's terms that translate 'self-evident' usually make no explicit reference to actual minds.

Gist of Idea

Frege's concept of 'self-evident' makes no reference to minds

Source

report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Tyler Burge - Frege on Knowing the Foundations 4

Book Ref

Burge,Tyler: 'Truth, Thought, Reason (on Frege)' [OUP 2001], p.351


A Reaction

This follows the distinction in Aquinas, between things that are intrinsically self-evident, and things that are self-evident to particular people. God, presumably, knows all of the former.

Related Idea


The 26 ideas from 'works'

Frege thinks there is an independent logical order of the truths, which we must try to discover [Frege, by Hart,WD]
For Frege, predicates are names of functions that map objects onto the True and False [Frege, by McGinn]
Frege gives a functional account of predication so that we can dispense with predicates [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
Frege always, and fatally, neglected the domain of quantification [Dummett on Frege]
Basic truths of logic are not proved, but seen as true when they are understood [Frege, by Burge]
If '5' is the set of all sets with five members, that may be circular, and you can know a priori if the set has content [Benardete,JA on Frege]
Frege aimed to discover the logical foundations which justify arithmetical judgements [Frege, by Burge]
Frege's logic showed that there is no concept of being [Frege, by Scruton]
The building blocks contain the whole contents of a discipline [Frege]
Frege made identity a logical notion, enshrined above all in the formula 'for all x, x=x' [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
To understand a thought, understand its inferential connections to other thoughts [Frege, by Burge]
Frege's concept of 'self-evident' makes no reference to minds [Frege, by Burge]
An apriori truth is grounded in generality, which is universal quantification [Frege, by Burge]
Frege said concepts were abstract entities, not mental entities [Frege, by Putnam]
A thought is not psychological, but a condition of the world that makes a sentence true [Frege, by Miller,A]
Frege's 'sense' is the strict and literal meaning, stripped of tone [Frege, by Miller,A]
'Sense' solves the problems of bearerless names, substitution in beliefs, and informativeness [Frege, by Miller,A]
'P or not-p' seems to be analytic, but does not fit Kant's account, lacking clear subject or predicate [Frege, by Weiner]
Analytic truths are those that can be demonstrated using only logic and definitions [Frege, by Miller,A]
Frege put forward an ontological argument for the existence of numbers [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
Frege did not think of himself as working with sets [Frege, by Hart,WD]
The null set is indefensible, because it collects nothing [Frege, by Burge]
Frege proposed a realist concept of a set, as the extension of a predicate or concept or function [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
Eventually Frege tried to found arithmetic in geometry instead of in logic [Frege, by Friend]
Truth does not admit of more and less [Frege]
Frege frequently expressed a contempt for language [Frege, by Dummett]