more on this theme     |     more from this thinker


Single Idea 16908

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic ]

Full Idea

The 'self-evidence' of which Russell talks so much can only be dispensed with in logic if language itself prevents any logical mistake.

Gist of Idea

We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes

Source

comment on Ludwig Wittgenstein (Notebooks 1914-1916 [1915], 4) by Robin Jeshion - Frege's Notion of Self-Evidence 4

Book Ref

-: 'Mind' [-], p.973


A Reaction

Jeshion presents this as a key idea, turning against Frege, and is the real source of the 'linguistic turn' in philosophy. If self-evidence is abandoned, then language itself is the guide to truth, so study language. I think I prefer Frege. See Quine?


The 9 ideas from 'Notebooks 1914-1916'

'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin]
Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein]
My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein]
The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein]
A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein]
We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein]
Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein]
Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein]
The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein]