more on this theme     |     more from this thinker


Single Idea 16913

[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation ]

Full Idea

It seems inconceivable how the intuition of a thing that is present should make me know it as it is in itself, for its properties cannot migrate into my faculty of representation.

Gist of Idea

I can't intuit a present thing in itself, because the properties can't enter my representations

Source

Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 282)

Book Ref

Kant,Immanuel: 'Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic', ed/tr. Lucas,Peter G. [Manchester UP 1971], p.38


A Reaction

One might compare this with Locke's distinction of primary and secondary, where the primary properties seem to 'migrate into my faculty of representation', but the secondary ones fail to do so. I think I prefer Locke. This idea threatens idealism.

Related Idea

Idea 16911 Intuition is a representation that depends on the presence of the object [Kant]


The 27 ideas from 'Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic'

Analytic judgements say clearly what was in the concept of the subject [Kant]
Analytic judgement rests on contradiction, since the predicate cannot be denied of the subject [Kant]
Mathematics cannot be empirical because it is necessary, and that has to be a priori [Kant]
Geometry is not analytic, because a line's being 'straight' is a quality [Kant]
7+5 = 12 is not analytic, because no analysis of 7+5 will reveal the concept of 12 [Kant]
Metaphysics is generating a priori knowledge by intuition and concepts, leading to the synthetic [Kant]
Mathematics can only start from an a priori intuition which is not empirical but pure [Kant]
I can't intuit a present thing in itself, because the properties can't enter my representations [Kant]
Intuition is a representation that depends on the presence of the object [Kant]
Some concepts can be made a priori, which are general thoughts of objects, like quantity or cause [Kant]
A priori synthetic knowledge is only of appearances, not of things in themselves [Kant]
A priori intuitions can only concern the objects of our senses [Kant]
A priori intuition of objects is only possible by containing the form of my sensibility [Kant]
All necessary mathematical judgements are based on intuitions of space and time [Kant]
Geometry rests on our intuition of space [Kant]
Mathematics cannot proceed just by the analysis of concepts [Kant]
Numbers are formed by addition of units in time [Kant]
If all empirical sensation of bodies is removed, space and time are still left [Kant]
Space must have three dimensions, because only three lines can meet at right angles [Kant]
I count the primary features of things (as well as the secondary ones) as mere appearances [Kant]
I admit there are bodies outside us [Kant]
I can make no sense of the red experience being similar to the quality in the object [Kant]
Appearance gives truth, as long as it is only used within experience [Kant]
The substance, once the predicates are removed, remains unknown to us [Kant]
'Transcendental' is not beyond experience, but a prerequisite of experience [Kant]
My dogmatic slumber was first interrupted by David Hume [Kant]
'Transcendental' concerns how we know, rather than what we know [Kant]