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Single Idea 16923

[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism ]

Full Idea

I do indeed admit that there are bodies outside us.

Gist of Idea

I admit there are bodies outside us

Source

Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 289 n.II)

Book Ref

Kant,Immanuel: 'Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic', ed/tr. Lucas,Peter G. [Manchester UP 1971], p.45


A Reaction

This is the end of a passage in which Kant very explicitly denies being an idealist. Of course, he says we can only know the representations of things, and not how they are in themselves.


The 23 ideas with the same theme [reality exists with our cognitive structure]:

Kant says things-in-themselves cause sensations, but then makes causation transcendental! [Henry of Ghent, by Pinkard]
In Kantian idealism, objects fit understanding, not vice versa [Kant, by Feuerbach]
Kant's idealism is a limited idealism based on the viewpoint of empiricism [Kant, by Feuerbach]
For Kant experience is either structured like reality, or generates reality's structure [Kant, by Gardner]
The concepts that make judgeable experiences possible are created spontaneously [Kant, by Pinkard]
'Transcendental' cognition concerns what can be known a priori of its mode [Kant]
We cannot know things in themselves, but are confined to appearances [Kant]
We have proved that bodies are appearances of the outer senses, not things in themselves [Kant]
Everything we intuit is merely a representation, with no external existence (Transcendental Idealism) [Kant]
I admit there are bodies outside us [Kant]
'Transcendental' is not beyond experience, but a prerequisite of experience [Kant]
Poetry is transcendental when it connects the ideal to the real [Schlegel,F]
The thing-in-itself is an empty dream [Fichte, by Pinkard]
Fichte's logic is much too narrow, and doesn't deduce ethics, art, society or life [Schlegel,F on Fichte]
I am myself, but not the external object; so I only sense myself, and not the object [Fichte]
Fichte believed in things-in-themselves [Fichte, by Moore,AW]
We can deduce experience from self-consciousness, without the thing-in-itself [Fichte]
Object for a subject and representation are the same thing [Schopenhauer]
Kant rightly separates appearance and thing-in-itself [Schopenhauer]
Consciousness is absolute reality, and everything exists through consciousness [Feuerbach]
Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW]
Transcendental idealism aims to explain objectivity through subjectivity [Bowie]
Unlike speculative idealism, transcendental idealism assumes the mind is embodied [Meillassoux]