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Single Idea 16939

[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff ]

Full Idea

'Yellow' and 'water' are mass terms, concerned only with spread; 'apple' and 'square' are terms of divided reference, concerned with both spread and individuation.

Gist of Idea

Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation

Source

Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.124)

Book Ref

Quine,Willard: 'Ontological Relativity and Other Essays' [Columbia 1969], p.124


A Reaction

Would you like some apple? Pass me that water. It is helpful to see that it is a requirement of 'individuation' that is missing from terms for stuff.


The 17 ideas with the same theme [general masses which are fairly homogeneous]:

A composite is a true unity if all of its parts fall under one essence [Scheibler]
Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell]
Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine]
Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things [Harré/Madden]
We have no idea of a third sort of thing, that isn't an individual, a class, or their mixture [Lewis]
Atomless gunk is an individual whose parts all have further proper parts [Lewis]
I reject talk of 'stuff', and treat it in terms of particles [Inwagen]
Early pre-Socratics had a mass-noun ontology, which was replaced by count-nouns [Benardete,JA]
If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things [Jubien]
Mass words do not have plurals, or numerical adjectives, or use 'fewer' [Hart,WD]
Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism [Sider]
Mass nouns admit 'much' and 'a little', and resist 'many' and 'few'. [Simons]
Mass terms (unlike plurals) are used with indifference to whether they can exist in units [Simons]
Gold is not its atoms, because the atoms must be all gold, but gold contains neutrons [Simons]
The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock]
Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock]
We talk of snow as what stays the same, when it is a heap or drift or expanse [Koslicki]