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Single Idea 16945

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent ]

Full Idea

Intuitively, what qualifies a thing as soluble though it never gets into water is that it is of the same kind as the things that actually did or will dissolve; it is similar to them.

Gist of Idea

We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve

Source

Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.130)

Book Ref

Quine,Willard: 'Ontological Relativity and Other Essays' [Columbia 1969], p.130


A Reaction

If you can judge that the similar things 'will' dissolve, you can cut to the chase and judge that this thing will dissolve.


The 11 ideas with the same theme [dispositions only exist when behaviour occurs]:

The Megarans say something is only capable of something when it is actually doing it [Aristotle]
Megaran actualism is just scepticism about the qualities of things [Aristotle]
Megaran actualists prevent anything from happening, by denying a capacity for it to happen! [Aristotle]
Peirce's later realism about possibilities and generalities went beyond logical positivism [Peirce, by Atkin]
We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine]
Explain unmanifested dispositions as structural similarities to objects which have manifested them [Quine, by Martin,CB]
What is a field of potentials, if it only consists of possible events? [Harré/Madden]
There doesn't seem to be anything in the actual world that can determine modal facts [Sidelle]
Megarian actualists deny unmanifested dispositions [Bird]
If a disposition is never instantiated, it shouldn't be part of our theory of nature [Corry]
Nomological dispositions (unlike ordinary ones) have to be continually realised [Vetter]