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Single Idea 16955
[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
]
Full Idea
Kripke stresses that membership of a single animal species requires identity or similarity of internal structure. In my view, what matters is genetic affinity - a common descent. Internal structure is merely a clue.
Gist of Idea
Kripke says internal structure fixes species; I say it is genetic affinity and a common descent
Source
report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by Michael Dummett - Could There Be Unicorns? 2
Book Ref
Dummett,Michael: 'The Seas of Language' [OUP 1993], p.332
A Reaction
The crucial test question would be whether we can make a tiger artificially (even constructing the DNA). I would say that if you make a tiger, that's a tiger, so Kripke is right and Dummett is wrong. The species is what it is, not where it came from.
The
18 ideas
with the same theme
[essence for animals is the species they belong to]:
16106
|
Generalities like man and horse are not substances, but universal composites of account and matter
[Aristotle]
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16144
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Genera are not substances, and do not exist apart from the ingredient species
[Aristotle]
|
12359
|
'Categories' answers 'what?' with species, genus, differerentia; 'Met.' Z.17 seeks causal essence
[Aristotle, by Wedin]
|
12068
|
Standardly, Aristotelian essences are taken to be universals of the species
[Aristotle, by Witt]
|
16141
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In 'Met.' he says genera can't be substances or qualities, so aren't in the ontology
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
|
16149
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Generic terms like 'man' are not substances, but qualities, relations, modes or some such thing
[Aristotle]
|
13434
|
In our ideas, the idea of essence is inseparable from the concept of a species
[Locke]
|
16035
|
If we based species on real essences, the individuals would be as indistinguishable as two circles
[Locke]
|
16036
|
Internal constitution doesn't decide a species; should a watch contain four wheels or five?
[Locke]
|
12987
|
For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member
[Leibniz]
|
12906
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Truths about species are eternal or necessary, but individual truths concern what exists
[Leibniz]
|
16955
|
Kripke says internal structure fixes species; I say it is genetic affinity and a common descent
[Kripke, by Dummett]
|
16996
|
Given that Nixon is indeed a human being, that he might not have been does not concern knowledge
[Kripke]
|
17370
|
Things that gradually change, like species, can still have essences
[Devitt]
|
17368
|
Essentialism concerns the nature of a group, not its category
[Devitt]
|
17388
|
It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds
[Dupré]
|
17389
|
A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one
[Dupré]
|
17870
|
Alien 'tigers' can't be tigers if they are not related to our tigers
[Almog]
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