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Full Idea
Another way of saying what objects a theory requires is to say that they are the objects that some of the predicates of the theory have to be true of, in order for the theory to be true.
Gist of Idea
Theories are committed to objects of which some of its predicates must be true
Source
Willard Quine (Existence and Quantification [1966], p.95)
Book Ref
Quine,Willard: 'Ontological Relativity and Other Essays' [Columbia 1969], p.95
A Reaction
The other was for the objects to be needed by the bound variables of the theory. This is the first-order approach, that predication is a commitment to an object. So what of predicates which have no application?
| 5745 | Quine says quantified modal logic creates nonsense, bad ontology, and false essentialism [Melia on Quine] |
| 8789 | Various strategies try to deal with the ontological commitments of second-order logic [Hale/Wright on Quine] |
| 4216 | Express a theory in first-order predicate logic; its ontology is the types of bound variable needed for truth [Quine, by Lowe] |
| 14490 | You can be implicitly committed to something without quantifying over it [Thomasson on Quine] |
| 16966 | Philosophers tend to distinguish broad 'being' from narrower 'existence' - but I reject that [Quine] |
| 18966 | Ontological commitment of theories only arise if they are classically quantified [Quine] |
| 16961 | In formal terms, a category is the range of some style of variables [Quine] |
| 16963 | Existence is implied by the quantifiers, not by the constants [Quine] |
| 16964 | Theories are committed to objects of which some of its predicates must be true [Quine] |
| 16965 | All we have of general existence is what existential quantifiers express [Quine] |