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Single Idea 16969
[filed under theme 14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
]
Full Idea
If the natural scientist refers the question 'Why?' to this set of four causes [aition] - matter, form, source of change, purpose - he will be explaining things in the way a natural scientist should.
Gist of Idea
Science refers the question Why? to four causes/explanations: matter, form, source, purpose
Source
Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 198a23)
Book Ref
Aristotle: 'Physics', ed/tr. Waterfield,Robin [OUP 1996], p.49
A Reaction
This is even more conclusive than Idea 16968 in showing that we have the Four Modes of Explanation, not the so-called Four Causes.
Related Idea
Idea 16968
There are as many causes/explanations as there are different types of why-question [Aristotle]
The
34 ideas
with the same theme
[picking out different styles of explanation]:
11246
|
Aristotelian explanations mainly divide things into natural kinds
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
11250
|
Four Explanations: the essence and form; the matter; the source; and the end
[Aristotle, by Politis]
|
12045
|
Aristotle's four 'causes' are four items which figure in basic explanations of nature
[Aristotle, by Annas]
|
16968
|
There are as many causes/explanations as there are different types of why-question
[Aristotle]
|
16969
|
Science refers the question Why? to four causes/explanations: matter, form, source, purpose
[Aristotle]
|
3320
|
Aristotle's standard analysis of species and genus involves specifying things in terms of something more general
[Aristotle, by Benardete,JA]
|
13297
|
To the four causes Plato adds a fifth, the idea which guided the event
[Seneca]
|
12913
|
Nature is explained by mathematics and mechanism, but the laws rest on metaphysics
[Leibniz]
|
21917
|
The four explanations: objects by causes, concepts by ground, maths by spacetime, ethics by motive
[Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
|
17897
|
Analytic explanation is wholes in terms of parts; synthetic is parts in terms of wholes or contexts
[Belnap]
|
13050
|
The 'inferential' conception is that all scientific explanations are arguments
[Salmon]
|
13059
|
Ontic explanations can be facts, or reports of facts
[Salmon]
|
13064
|
The three basic conceptions of scientific explanation are modal, epistemic, and ontic
[Salmon]
|
14366
|
An explanation is a table of statistical information
[Salmon, by Strevens]
|
17672
|
A good reason for something (the smoke) is not an explanation of it (the fire)
[Armstrong]
|
19061
|
An explanation is often a deduction, but that may well beg the question
[Dummett]
|
7459
|
Follow maths for necessary truths, and jurisprudence for contingent truths
[Hacking]
|
16182
|
Two main types of explanation are by causes, or by citing a theoretical framework
[Cartwright,N]
|
17090
|
Most explanations are just sentences, not arguments
[Ruben]
|
18222
|
Beneath every extrinsic explanation there is an intrinsic explanation
[Field,H]
|
17271
|
Is there metaphysical explanation (as well as causal), involving a constitutive form of determination?
[Fine,K]
|
17291
|
We explain by identity (what it is), or by truth (how things are)
[Fine,K]
|
22926
|
In addition to causal explanations, they can also be inferential, or definitional, or purposive
[Le Poidevin]
|
14319
|
Nomothetic explanations cite laws, and structural explanations cite mechanisms
[Mumford]
|
4812
|
Explanation is either showing predictability, or showing necessity, or showing causal relations
[Psillos]
|
6750
|
Explanations are causal, nomic, psychological, psychoanalytic, Darwinian or functional
[Bird]
|
20043
|
Evolutionary explanations look to the past or the group, not to the individual
[Stout,R]
|
17321
|
Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain
[Liggins]
|
17323
|
If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist
[Liggins]
|
17298
|
Two things being identical (like water and H2O) is not an explanation
[Audi,P]
|
17319
|
There are 'conceptual' explanations, with their direction depending on complexity
[Schnieder]
|
19018
|
Explanations by disposition are more stable and reliable than those be external circumstances
[Vetter]
|
19020
|
Grounding is a kind of explanation, suited to metaphysics
[Vetter]
|
23805
|
Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery
[Schulte]
|